



Daily Report

Sub-Saharan Africa

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Tuesday
19 September 1989

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19 September 1989

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8 Heads of State Meet in Zaire To Discuss Angola

Leaders Arrive for Talks

AB1809160389 Kinshasa AZAP in French 1550 GMT
18 Sep 89

[Text] Kinshasa, 18 Sep (AZAP)—Presidents Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, Joachim Chissano of Mozambique, Jose Eduardo dos Santos of Angola, Omar Bongo of Gabon, Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, and Denis Sassou-Nguesso of Congo arrived in Kinshasa this morning to participate in the meeting on reconciliation in Angola, which will be held in the historic city of Nsele.

They were welcomed upon their arrival by the president of the Republic, Marshal Mobutu Sese Seko, who was accompanied by heads of the Armed Forces branches. The Sao Tome and Principe president had arrived earlier in Kinshasa. They will leave Kinshasa today for their respective countries.

Summit Opens 18 Sep

AB1809135289 Libreville Africa No 1 in French
1230 GMT 18 Sep 89

[Text] The summit of eight central and southern African leaders on Angola began early this afternoon at Nsele 40 km north of Kinshasa in the absence of representatives of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola [UNITA], the armed opposition to the Luanda regime. This summit, which includes representatives of Angola, Congo, Gabon, Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe, Zaire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, should enable the participants to review the evolution of the situation in Angola since the 23 August meeting in Harare, Zimbabwe. According to a well-informed source in the Zairian capital, the participation of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi at the Nsele talks was not expected. This source pointed out that Jonas Savimbi did not want to bring upon himself the wrath of his movement before its national conference scheduled for 24 September in Jamba, somewhere in the Angolan jungle.

The negotiations between the Luanda regime and UNITA, four rounds of which have already been held in Kinshasa since the June summit in Gbadolite, Zaire, and since the last summit in Harare, Zimbabwe, were suspended because of very serious divergences between the two sides, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola and UNITA. These divergences concern the interpretation of the Gbadolite agreement. Yesterday, on the eve of the Kinshasa summit, the United States declared its firm support for Savimbi's UNITA. Washington rejected any suggestion of exile, amnesty, or even integration of UNITA members, thus showing its opposition to the Luanda government. The United States, as we know, also supports UNITA and its objectives for national reconciliation in Angola followed by free and fair elections. The U.S. Government has also reiterated its trust in President Mobutu's mediation efforts. But

Jonas Savimbi, the UNITA leader, has recently questioned President Mobutu's impartiality.

'Draft Declaration' Adopted

AB1909094689 Paris AFP in French 2241 GMT
18 Sep 89

[By Jean-Pierre Rejete]

[Text] Nsele (Zaire), 18 Sep (AFP)—The eight central and southern African leaders who met today at Nsele (40 km north of Kinshasa) for a summit on the evolution of the situation in Angola adopted a "draft declaration" that will soon be submitted to the leader of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola [UNITA], Jonas Savimbi, according to a final communique issued after the meeting.

This summit, which was expected to last 3 hours, and which took place on board President Mobutu Sese Seko's yacht on the Zaire-Congo River, finally ended shortly before 2000 GMT. The contents of the draft declaration, however, were not disclosed. According to sources close to the Zairian presidency, the UNITA leader—the major absentee at this meeting—who was invited by the mediator to attend the summit, finally declined the offer at the last minute. According to the same sources, in a message sent to Marshal Mobutu, the "rebel" leader excused himself for his absence and renewed his "commitment" to the Gbadolite agreement as well as his "trust in the mediator."

However, an 11-member UNITA delegation led by Jorge Valentim, the "minister of information," attended the meeting on observer status. At the opening of the summit early this afternoon, the Zairian president called on the parties involved in the Angolan conflict to "overcome their differences and seize the opportunity (afforded by this new summit which follows that of Harare on 23 August) to restore peace to the Angolan people who need it for their development." "I also address the same message to all those who are closely or remotely concerned by the Angolan problem by calling on them to stop any interference likely to hamper the restoration of peace in Angola," the Zairian head of state added. This statement was made since, the day before, the United States expressed its "firm support for UNITA and its objectives of national reconciliation," some observers remarked. The U.S. State Department, it was recalled, had also rejected the suggestions of "temporary exile (for Savimbi) and integration (of UNITA into the Angolan nation)."

According to Luanda, these two issues as well as "the end of any external interference" in Angolan matters are the ones which were accepted in principle by the Angolan "rebels."

In the final text of the Kinshasa meeting, no reference was made to these three conditions. The communique only stated that "President Mobutu had informed the 18 heads of state present at Gbadolite that Jonas Savimbi

had accepted the Angolan Government's internal peace plan." According to some observers, today's statement, by President Mobutu, which was more restrained, could be favorable to the resumption of direct negotiations between the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola and UNITA, four rounds of which have already taken place in Kinshasa. Finally, the eight central and southern African presidents agreed before leaving to meet soon in Libreville at a date that is yet to be fixed.

PANA Reports 'Peace Plan'

*AB1909102089 Dakar PANA in English 0950 GMT
19 Sep 89*

[Text] Kinshasa, 19 Sept (ZIANA/PANA)—Eight African leaders including Zimbabwe President Robert Mugabe Monday, drew-up a draft declaration of a peace plan agreement which they hope to be signed by UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi to end the 14-year-old Angolan war.

Savimbi, who was expected to sign the Gbadolite agreement on Angola at Monday's meeting did not attend the day-long summit held at Nsele, 60 kilometres from the Zairian capital, the fourth to focus on the implementation of the Angola peace programme.

The presidents of Angola, Zaire, Gabon, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe and Congo said in a communique that a draft declaration was not made public but diplomatic sources said it was largely a reaffirmation of the Gbadolite agreement.

The eight leaders said in the communique that they were committed to the 22 June Gbadolite agreement in which Savimbi accepted a ceasefire, the re-integration of his elements into Angolan institutions and to retire in exile voluntarily "while the peace process is in progress or until such a time that his presence is required in Angola."

Savimbi has denied that he ever accepted to go into voluntary exile. His UNITA movement renounced the 24 June ceasefire and resumed fighting in August, following a Harare summit at which the eight leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the historic Gbadolite agreement.

Monday's five-hour meeting was held aboard the private yacht of Zairian President Mobutu Sese Seko on the Zaire River.

Summit chairman Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda said Savimbi had not turned up for the meeting although he was invited by Mobutu.

Diplomatic sources said the UNITA leader was in Kinshasa on the eve of the summit and had allegedly stayed away to underscore his anger over the "retirement in exile clause" of the Gbadolite agreement. They were conflicting reports of whether he was in Zaire, Angola or Cote d'Ivoire.

Savimbi reportedly left his own negotiating document with Mobutu on the eve of the summit but its details were not made available.

Mobutu's seven colleagues expressed confidence in him as chief mediator in the Angolan peace programme and "renewed their trust in him."

Another summit, on a date to be announced, is scheduled for Congo.

Before the start of the summit, Zambia and Zaire signed a treaty to end a century-old border dispute.

Kaunda and Mobutu both said the treaty, a result of a joint commission established in Gbadolite in August 1982, had demonstrated that Africans could solve their own conflicts amicably without foreign intervention.

U.S. Blamed for Savimbi's 'Arrogance'

*AB1909105589 Dakar PANA in English 1005 GMT
19 Sep 89*

[By Elisa Cossa]

[Text] Nsele (Zaire), 19 Sept (AIM/PANA)—Encouragement by the United States Administration lies behind the sabotage of the Angolan peace process by the counter-revolutionary group UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) and its leader Jonas Savimbi.

That at least is what is believed by the eight African heads of state who met in Nsele, 60 kilometres from the Zairian capital, Kinshasa, on Monday to discuss the Angolan peace plan. The plan is now in serious difficulty due to persistent UNITA violations of the cease-fire, and to Savimbi's rejection of the terms that he had originally accepted at Gbadolite, also in Zaire, on 22 June.

The Angolan peace process was begun at a May summit in Luanda attended by eight heads of state—Jose Eduardo dos Santos of Angola, Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique, Denis Sassou-Nguesso of Congo, Omar Bongo of Gabon, Manuel Pinto da Costa of Sao Tome and Principe, Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe.

The Gbadolite peace accord was reached in front of 18 heads of state, and sealed by a handshake between President dos Santos and Savimbi. The original group of eight met in Harare to publish the hitherto secret parts of the Gbadolite accord, refuting Savimbi's claims that he had never agreed to go into exile. It is this group of eight that met for the third time on Monday at Nsele.

Tactically, the eight presidents have refused to name the United States publicly as the obstacle to peace—but in private they blame the Bush administration for Savimbi's contradictory arrogance.

Savimbi is believed to have received assurances from Washington that the Angolan Government can be forced to make further concessions.

American diplomats in Kinshasa do not hide their wrecking role. In an interview on Monday with AIM [Mozambique Information Agency], U.S. ambassador to Zaire William Harrop declared openly that the U.S. would give its support to UNITA until there was "national reconciliation" in Angola.

For Harrop, "national reconciliation" does not exclude Savimbi from power in Luanda. Harrop said that Savimbi would not accept voluntary exile.

The United States is continuing to pump military aid into UNITA, and in 1989 such aid is budgeted at 30 million U.S. dollars.

At the weekend the U.S. State Department issued a declaration in support of Savimbi's rejection of "exile, amnesty or integration"—though it was precisely this that Savimbi had agreed to in June at Gbadolite.

Apparently a U.S. envoy contacted Savimbi in Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire, one of the African capitals where Savimbi can still count on support.

The eight presidents meeting at Nsele were trying to salvage the Angolan peace accord. They reaffirmed the role of mediator assumed by Zairian President Mobutu Sese Seko—and this seems to have been the tonic of the preparatory ministerial meeting in Kinshasa.

Over the last two months Mobutu's role has come under fire from UNITA, whose communiques are frequently issued from Abidjan.

A delegation from UNITA was in Zaire on Monday, but was not scheduled to meet with the eight presidents. Zairian Foreign Minister Nguz a Karl-I-Bond confirmed this to AIM, saying that it was now up to Mobutu to contact UNITA. "Today is a heads of state summit," he said, letting it be understood that he believed the path to peace in Angola was still lengthy.

The last meeting of the eight presidents, in Harare, issued a statement that was particularly discomforting for UNITA and its American and South African backers,

since it showed that Savimbi had consistently lied about the content of the Gbadolite agreement.

They revealed that the unpublished parts of the Gbadolite agreement included the "voluntary and temporary" exile of Savimbi, respect for the existing constitutional order in Angola, the integration of UNITA members into the existing organisations of Angolan State and society, and the end to all foreign interference in Angola's affairs.

Savimbi Representative Discusses Summit

*AB1909111889 Dakar PANA in French 0945 GMT
19 Sep 89*

[Text] Kinshasa, 19 Sep (AZAP/PANA)—Jorge Valentim, information official of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola and leader of his organization's delegation to the Kinshasa summit, yesterday said that the Gbadolite declaration had not requested Jonas Savimbi's exile or the merger of UNITA and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola [MPLA]. The declaration, he told newsmen, did not take into account the Angolan Constitution and the laws of Luanda. According to him, these three points strongly contested by UNITA are included in the communique issued at the end of the Harare summit and are therefore contrary to the Gbadolite declaration in which a consensus was reached on peace, national reconciliation, cease-fire, and the establishment of an MPLA-UNITA joint commission to conduct negotiations under the auspices of Zaire.

With this agreement as a preamble, the Kinshasa summit opened following the Gbadolite summit. "We endorse the Gbadolite declaration," he said. On Savimbi's absence from the Kinshasa summit despite a personal invitation, Mr Valentim said that he is representing the leader of his movement and that Savimbi is absent because of the intensification of clashes between Angolan Government forces and UNITA fighters as well as preparations for the UNITA congress.

He nevertheless said that the UNITA chairman is currently on a visit outside Angola. "He is on a tour to other countries to brief his hosts on the situation in Angola, where war still rages," he concluded.

Burundi**Belgian Minister Praises Government Policy**

EA1509134989 Bujumbura Domestic Service in French 0420 GMT 15 Sep 89

[Excerpt] Mr Andre Geens, the Belgian minister of cooperation and development, arrived in our country yesterday to prepare for a visit by his country's prime minister and the meeting of the two countries' joint commission, which will be held soon in Bujumbura. He said he was satisfied with the relaunching of cooperation between our two countries after a period of ups and downs.

[Begin recording] [Geens] I think that in the current state of affairs, our cooperation is going quite well. A package of projects is being implemented. The minister told us verbally about the problems, and we are here to solve them. This is one of the reasons that I came. I am also here to prepare the joint commission meeting which is to be held at the beginning of October.

[Unidentified reporter] Mr Minister, how is the development of the political situation in Burundi perceived in Belgium?

[Geens] It is always delicate for a minister from a foreign country to express his views on the internal politics of another country. But I think that I can assure you that Burundi and the present Burundian Government are carrying out a very courageous policy. I believe and hope that the government can manage to solve not only the problems existing inside the country, but also the economic problems, which are quite serious. [passage omitted]

Chad**Foreign Minister Leaves For Kuwait**

AB1809194589 Ndjamenia Domestic Service in French 1900 GMT 18 Sep 89

[Text] External Relations Minister Acheikh Ibn Oumar left Ndjamenia for Kuwait with a message from the president of the Republic, El Hadj Hissein Habre, for the amir of Kuwait, Jabir al-Ahmad al-Jabir al-Sabah. The Chadian foreign minister's visit is in line with the reinforcement of relations of cooperation between the two countries. Acheikh Ibn Oumar is accompanied by Chad's roving ambassador, (Abdelkader Yassi).

Gabon**Malagasy Foreign Minister Begins Visit 16 Sep**

AB1809095989 Libreville Africa No 1 in French 1830 GMT 17 Sep 89

[Text] Malagasy Foreign Minister Jean Bemananjara arrived in Gabon yesterday evening to lay the foundation for concrete relations between Antananarivo and Libreville. The Malagasy minister told Joseph Talalac of Africa No 1's editorial section that these relations have so far been at the human level.

[Begin recording] [Bemananjara] My first visit to Gabon is to establish contact between Gabon and Madagascar. President Didier Ratsiraka and Omar Bongo recently met at the celebrations of the French bicentennial and, above all, at the ninth summit of the Nonaligned Movement in Belgrade. My presence here is therefore at the orders of my president who has sent me to Gabon to develop relations of cooperation and friendship with the Gabonese Republic.

[Talalac] To be precise, can you brief us on the level of relations between Madagascar and Gabon?

[Bemananjara] The answer is very simple. Relations have so far been purely on the human level. Even during the First Republic, under President Tsiranana, the two presidents knew each other. But in regard to true and effective cooperation, no moves have been made yet between the two countries. It is true that in the field of diplomacy, it is men who promote all these relations. Now that the two peoples know each other, it is up to them to create a climate of understanding for cooperation under which a lot of things can be done. I have told you that before my visit, our relations were purely human. This is a good thing. But now, as far as inter-African cooperation is concerned, something concrete must be done and that is the purpose of my contact visit to Gabon, to see in which fields we can cooperate. [end recording]

Rwanda**Belgian Prime Minister Arrives 17 Sep**

EA1709181389 Kigali Domestic Service in French 1115 GMT 17 Sep 89

[Summary] The Belgian prime minister, Mr Wilfried Martens, arrived in Rwanda today for a 3-day official visit.

Zaire**Refugee Exchange With Angola Announced**

AB1809174089 Kinshasa AZAP in French 1553 GMT 18 Sep 89

[Text] Kinshasa, 18 Sep (AZAP)—About 50,000 Zairian and Angolan refugees are going to be voluntarily repatriated to their respective countries as of 20 September under the auspices of the UN High Commission for Refugees (HCR) for central Africa and in collaboration with the Executive Council of Zaire and the Angolan Government.

Heikki Keto, HCR deputy regional delegate, told AZAP today that the first phase of this 3-month operation involves 2,000 Zairians in Angola and 2,500 Angolans living in Zaire, mainly in the Lualaba subregion in Shaba. The cost of local transport by road and rail, the air link between Luanda and Lubumbashi, and the cost of food as well as miscellaneous requirements and school fees will be borne by international donors and the countries involved in the operation.

Ethiopia

President Mengistu Makes Anniversary Address

EA1309134489 Addis Ababa Domestic Service
in Amharic 1726 GMT 12 Sep 89

[Address by President Mengistu Haile Mariam on occasion of the 15th anniversary of the revolution at Revolution Square in Addis Ababa—recorded; time not given]

[Text] Members of the Ethiopian Revolutionary Armed Forces, fathers, mothers, dear diplomats, members of continental and international organizations, guests and comrades: At the beginning of a new year, it is usual to look toward peace and development for all citizens. In this spirit, on this date, for the last 15 years, we have been assessing the situation in our country and stating our aims, plans, and programs for the country's development. On this occasion, we all hope and desire for great achievements for our country, but these hopes should be based on the practical involvement and the will of the entire Ethiopian people.

When we consider the immense sacrifices made by the gallant sons of this country and people, it is easy for any faithful citizen and observer to imagine how far we would have gone in our development. Let us analyze the situation objectively. It is very clear that at the present time, the wishes of the citizens are not being fulfilled according to their desires. However, we should not limit our consciousness to this. We should understand the situation in which we find ourselves in its entirety. Let all the broad masses of this country examine the situation.

The political or economic steps taken to safeguard the interests of the people, beginning with the changing of the ownership of land, which is the main source of wealth to the people in our country, and including the defense of the country from various attacks and the overcoming of various man-made and natural disasters, have been achieved with the involvement and consent of the people.

Accordingly, except in areas where peace has been constantly disrupted, people are reaping the fruits of the revolution, gained through popular struggle. As such, the people have never been deprived of their democratic rights and ownership of the land, as was the case under the feudal system. Today, our country is no longer held in the bondage of illiteracy. Instead, the masses, through basic literacy, have obtained their right to knowledge.

The revolutionary party and government have worked untiringly to agitate, educate, and organize the people, instead of dividing them on ethnic and religious grounds in order to exploit and oppress them. They have done this by informing the people of the popular rights that have been achieved through hard struggle and sacrifice.

Today Ethiopia is a country where the sexual and religious equality of its nationals are constitutionally

respected. Generally, the people have been guaranteed the determination of their own destiny by the constitution, which they approved by referendum and the republican government, which was established in accordance with the constitution. Certain narrow-minded parties have been trying to deny this evident reality, with confusion and distortion, thereby holding the revolution responsible for their antipeople activities. Despite this, a democratic base has been established for the people, with their participation and through their sacrifice. This democratic base is of benefit to the people in their social and economic development.

It is no secret that a massive amount of national wealth, which could have been used for national development, has been diverted to defense in order to safeguard the well-being and integrity of our country. Not only our wealth, but also the dear children of our country have sacrificed their lives out of respect for their country and compatriots. For those of us who want progress, development, and justice, this has been a very sad and painful turn of events.

The trust handed down to us in blood by our heroic forefathers, that we will safeguard Mother Ethiopia and hand it down to the next generation, has demanded a great deal of sacrifice, but we cannot shy away from this historic responsibility. We never have and we never will. We are obligated to pay. However, peace has been our preoccupation since the inception of our revolution. Right from the outset of our revolution we called for peace, cooperation, and mutual effort for the common good.

When we said: Ethiopia first, without bloodshed, we meant that we should put Ethiopia before personal gains and narrow regionalism. Although we were forced to defend ourselves when the responses to our peace call were negative, our hands, stretched out in peace, have never been withdrawn.

We have made untiring efforts to solve the problem that has caused continuous bloodshed in the northern part of our country. In fact, in today's world, where priority and wide support are being given to the philosophy of solving conflicts through peaceful means, we too have created suitable conditions for the peaceful achievement of peace through the new peace initiative formulated by the National Shengo, so that, in line with this positive spirit, we might be able to solve our problems and focus our full attention on development.

Accordingly, as is known, first stage talks opened in Atlanta, in the United States, recently. As peace is our priority, we shall do everything necessary to ensure that the efforts are not hindered by trivialities and are pursued as far as possible, so that the suffering of the people is brought to an end and their desire for peace is realized.

The peace delegation that is representing the government, party, and people of Ethiopia is unhesitatingly doing everything it can to fulfill its mission and the

desire of the people. But according to information we have received so far, our opposition shows absolutely no readiness for peace.

If this continues, the time will soon come when it will be revealed clearly to the people of Ethiopia and the whole world who stands for peace and who stands for destruction. As we have repeatedly and officially stated, our unwavering desires and efforts are to end war and to end the suffering of the people.

At a time when the human race is on the eve of the 21st century, war is prevalent outside the vicinity of the civilized world, in the developing, or Third World, countries. This is one and the main expression of backwardness. Ethiopia is part of this, and we are deeply concerned about this. In fact, in our internal situation it is the backward section of our society that has embarked on war, terrorism, and looting as their main occupation, especially now. Although our desire for peace is sincere, we absolutely cannot disregard any type of attack, from any quarter, which threatens the identity of our country, peace, and the human rights of the people.

All citizens should realize that we cannot achieve the peace we yearn for by saying amen to attacks. From the start, it has been clear that our sincere efforts for peace have been interpreted as having emanated from weakness, and they have encouraged the arrogance of the hypocrites. Our aversion to war will not of itself do away with war.

As was officially stated recently, while we have been making peaceful efforts to achieve the genuine eradication of war and the prevalence of peace, the results of which have been eagerly anticipated by the people, the party that has been creating chaos in Tigray and which calls itself rebels of Tigray has, after causing suffering to the people of Tigray, and impoverishing, looting, and robbing them, extended its mission of destruction to the people of neighboring administrative areas.

All citizens should understand that the ongoing, hateful, all-out attack against our revolutionary forces, which are the united arm of the sons of the people whose mission is to repulse attempts to shed the blood of innocent citizens and to destabilize their peaceful livelihood, is an act that absolutely cannot be tolerated.

Dear compatriots, our Ethiopia, which was one of the strongest and most famous of ancient states, has been made backward and underdeveloped by the selfish aims of the regional kingdoms, who have mistrusted each other, engaged in fratricidal wars, and wasted national wealth in this pursuit. This is a historical scar which we will always remember with great sadness. Internal division and negative activity rendered the country ripe for external invasion, and many of our leaders were beheaded by swords, and some committed suicide, in the face of these aggressions. The internal strife and the resultant foreign aggression have left a major scar of shame in the history of Ethiopia and this should never be forgotten.

On the contrary, those who coordinated and led our people to victory are, today, the source of our pride and the most positive aspect of our history. When we look back at our history, we see that our country has encountered good and bad, aggression and respect, strength and weakness. This situation, especially that which subjected the country to backwardness, has been removed through our revolution and popular participation. By removing it, we had hoped to be able to concentrate all our efforts on development and reconstruction efforts, and, although most of our hopes have been realized, there are still dissidents, who, as ever before, are opposing the will and interest of the Ethiopian people.

The starting of war again by the group that calls itself rebels of Tigray, at a time when we are striving to implement the peace initiative, which we issued through our National Shengo and which has received support from all directions, clearly reveals this group's nature and its desire to pursue this more dangerous path. While the destruction being perpetrated by the group that calls itself liberators of Tigray and claims to stand for the liberation of Tigray has deeply saddened the people of Ethiopia and should be halted, the attacks it has carried out and its statements that this war and chaos should be spread to other parts of Ethiopia indicate that it will not hesitate to profit at the expense of the blood and lives of the people.

The situation in the north, which has peace problems, is made more sad by the fact that nature has been continuously harsh on that area. At a time when the instability and the misery of the people has reached unprecedented levels in that part of our country, the specter of a major famine is hovering over them due to the inadequate rainfall during the recent long rains. Therefore, it should be appreciated that creating problems of peace and preventing our compatriots in those areas from receiving the assistance they require from other areas of our country is depriving them of their human rights.

It is clear to all mankind what it means to create obstacles such that people are burned by the inferno of war and suffer from hunger. Is it not enough that our people and country have been ridiculed by the international media due to famine and war? The famine, which exists only in some parts of the country and could be overcome by compatriots' support and aid, has become an international issue. Can this be a source of pride? Who will benefit from the uprising of the few against the whole of the Ethiopian people? In a country where different nationalities live in equality and cooperation, is it beneficial to the people to agitate and engage a certain portion of the society in such a backward and shameful activity?

This people, who for centuries has been languishing as a result of man-made and natural calamities, are told that the cause of their problem is the lack of peace and unity of Ethiopia and that their enemies are the Amhara and Oromo tribes.

With this tribalist objective, they are driving the people like animals against their own kith and kin, subjecting them to fratricidal war. This may benefit the bandits, but the Tigray people should realize their motive and nip it in the bud. Who are the Tigray terrorists? What do they really want?

We have no doubt that the Tigray people are fully-fledged Ethiopians. That is why, at the outbreak of the revolution, we armed them to defend themselves from the Eritrean problem, which might have disrupted their peace. But, contrary to our intentions, they collected these weapons and established the so-called Tigray Liberation Front. At the same time, supporting the secession of Eritrea, they actively participated in the Eritrean movement. Then they said they would restore the ruling power taken from them by the ancient Agew dynasty.

On another occasion, they claimed they had no enmity for the Ethiopian people, but were only anti-Dergue, anti-Soviet, and anticommunist. Immediately afterwards, they said they were seeking a revolution based on the Albanian system [previous word in English] led by a communist league [previous word in English] or party. Recently, they claimed to be Ethiopian freedom fighters, with all their previous self-claimed status maintained.

On our part, if the cause of the problem of the Tigray people is Ethiopian unity and peace, if the problem for the Tigray people is what our party, government, and Army have done for them by safeguarding their security, combatting the destruction caused by natural calamities and hunger, reconstructing what has been demolished by the bandits, and, in general, if government activities are really the source of their problem and their call for rebellion, we say: Let the Tigray people see whether the so-called freedom fighters undertake any humanitarian or development activity that is relevant to their progress. Leaving the judgment and decision to the Tigray people, we withdrew our Army and government structures from Tigray for a limited period.

Today, in Tigray region, the people are without electricity, clean water distribution, health services, economic services, schools, trade, transport, or even any means of communication among themselves. It has become a region of anarchy, where there is no peace and where authority belongs to the armed and the strong. Banks and money are not to be found. What were formerly tourist and entertainment hotels have been turned into shops where local brews are sold.

We withdrew to avoid a situation such as that which occurred in 1944, when a few sadists of the region caused a tragic massacre as soon as the fascist Italians had left. We did not want the same situation to arise in the presence of the revolutionary government and army. But the terrorists in the region have interpreted that incident as a good and constructive one. When they celebrated their 15th rebellious year last year, they promised to repeat such a massacre in a short while. They took

children out of schools, stopped the peasants from farming, and conscripted even the shepherds for their destructive activity.

Workers, fathers, and mothers, what would you call this? We are going forward. What are we being forced to do? Again, on this historic day and at this historic forum, I leave the judgment to all the people of Ethiopia and especially to the people of Tigray. We cannot, however, exist, let alone continue, under these conditions.

Inasmuch as the revolution is struggling to enable all Ethiopians to uplift their individual and social living standards in a practical sense and on a basis of equality so as to carry out national construction in peace under a democratic system, I believe that not only this generation, but also the next, will historically find themselves unable to forgive the atrocities being perpetrated on various spurious pretexts. The messengers of doom must realize that their attempts to proliferate destruction and mock the Ethiopian people at a time when we are seeking a peaceful solution to a problem, which has been deliberately manufactured, by putting forward a new peace initiative through the National Shengo, the highest forum of people's power, and have taken very significant action towards its implementation, will not be viewed with leniency.

Our revolutionary Armed Forces and territorial militia and the people have been making unceasing sacrifices to stem the massacres being perpetrated to escalate the attack initiated on the morning coinciding with the opening of the third regular session of the National Shengo, that is, on 31 August 1989. It is known that the country's regular transport services were disrupted for a few days due to the urgent actions we undertook to move certain units of our Armed Forces from one part of the country to the troubled area. Some of us may be asking why other requirements have not been met after coordinating the situation. I would like at this juncture strongly to stress that, although the Ethiopian people have long been aware of the effects of war, we must remain vigilant as long as we remain under attack, and must not be diverted by our daily needs.

We not only desire an end to war and are ready to pay any reasonable price for the attainment of peace, but to assume that everything our opponents claim is correct and will lead to peace is absolutely (?ridiculous). The important thing is not only to ask what, but also to properly understand how it is to be implemented and how it will benefit lasting national independence and dignity.

We are totally determined to hold peace talks with all the opposition forces and to reach solutions on issues affecting the interests of the people. We accordingly affirm that we will not hesitate to do anything correctly expected of us for the attainment of peace. However, all sides should fully realize that attacks made with a view to forcibly taking advantage of the Ethiopian people's positive stance for peace will be repulsed. It is futile to believe that Ethiopia's workers, farmers, scholars,

advantaged citizens, young people, and all the rest will say amen and accept, or just express sympathy alone, or ignore national and social affairs unless directly affected, while plots are being hatched to tarnish our history, which embraces our proud and centuries-old identity of nationhood and government, and to degrade the people. This has never happened and is unlikely to happen in the future.

The struggle is continuing today both peacefully and otherwise, inasmuch as some quarters are yielding to the temptation to use force. The problem calling for a solution is the tangible one which exists today. The country requires its citizens to solve this problem here and now. I am therefore confident that all Ethiopian citizens everywhere deployed in all spheres will not be found wanting by history and the generations for becoming passive observers at this time.

Working people of Ethiopia, although the issue of peace held pride of place last year, numerous constructive tasks have been carried out, as reported during the 10th regular session of our party's Central Committee and the third session of our National Shengo. Due to better weather in particular, and by virtue of the efforts of all the working people, our national economy has developed positively. In the political sphere, the structures of the Republic within which the people will administer themselves have been set up in some parts of our country. Plans have been drawn up to set up the same in the remaining parts this year after the ground has been suitably prepared. Encouraging results have also been achieved in national foreign affairs, including our strengthened peace efforts of the year.

However, as stated earlier, it is known that we also encountered obstacles. In particular, due to the problem of peace in the northern part of our country, the price our compatriots in that area and the people of Ethiopia in general have had to pay and the general suffering they have had to undergo have been enormous. It will be recalled that one of the negative trends was the treacherous coup d'etat carried out in an attempt to topple the edifice of our popular system to replace it with the yoke of dictatorship of a few over the working masses. However, the attempt was immediately crushed by our decisive revolutionary Armed Forces and people, who are faithful to their goal.

Suitable plans have been drawn up for this year's development to enable our hopes to be more effectively realized. Our peace efforts will this year be given priority and strengthened.

This will also be the year during which preparations for our party's second congress, which will formulate methods to make a major contribution to our society's development and improved standard of living, will be

completed; preparations for the 5-year development plan will be completed; and organs of people's power will be established in all areas where they remain lacking. It will also be a year during which we will make strenuous efforts to implement economic and other plans. The realization of the aspirations of all citizens cannot be viewed separately from the preservation of the identity of our motherland's, which, together with its progress, belongs to us all. In this struggle to carry out his duties in his particular field, therefore, no Ethiopian should forget for a second that he is a citizen of Ethiopia, a member of the proud Ethiopian people, and part of centuries of history. Let us clearly realize that the sole guarantee of and path towards our self-respect and progress lie in strengthening our revolutionary muscle and struggling loyally for better times by strengthening our unity in action and spirit. Ethiopia first! Thank you.

North Yemen Agrees To Host Talks With ELF

*AB1809114689 Paris AFP in English 0840 GMT
18 Sep 89*

[Text] Addis Ababa, Sept 18 (AFP)—North Yemeni President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih has agreed to use his good offices to persuade the five factions of the rebel Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) to meet the Ethiopian authorities for peace talks as a group, a senior Ethiopian party official announced here Sunday.

Kassa Kebede, a Central Committee member of the ruling Workers' Party, said the North Yemeni leader had agreed to the holding of a meeting in Sanaa for the five factions to meet under one umbrella, rather than separately, with the Ethiopian Government.

Speaking on his return from a visit to North Yemen, Mr Kassa said he expected the meeting, part of Addis Ababa's efforts to end the costly 28-year civil war in Eritrea, could be arranged soon.

Another meeting between the Ethiopian Government and rebels of the rival Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), the more powerful guerilla movement on the ground in Eritrea, is still in progress in Atlanta, Georgia, under the auspices of former U.S. President Jimmy Carter.

Sanaa is one of six capitals named to host future substantive talks between the EPLF and the government if current negotiations aimed at hammering out an agenda and date prove successful.

The others are Cairo, Khartoum, Dar es Salaam, Nairobi and Harare.

Similar talks between Addis Ababa and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) have also been tentatively planned for the North Yemeni capital but they could well be jeopardized because of renewed fighting since September 8.

Uganda

Rwanda Joint Commission Meeting Opens

*EAI809202489 Kampala Domestic Service in English
1400 GMT 18 Sep 89*

[Excerpt] A 3-day meeting of the Uganda-Rwanda permanent joint commission has opened at the Shorten Hotel in Kampala with a call on the participants to come out with concrete decisions concerning the strengthening of the existing mutual relationship between the two countries. The call was made by the leader of the Ugandan delegation, who is also permanent secretary to the Ministry of Foreign and Regional Affairs, Mr (Joshua Chalimpa). He said the two countries have been friendly for decades and there was great need to

strengthen the [words indistinct] understanding and well-being of the two sister countries.

The leader of the Rwandese delegation and permanent secretary to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Mr (Dizimana), hailed the existing relationship between the two countries and their leaders, whose efforts to create harmony and good-neighborliness had enabled such meetings to take place from time to time. He said this is a clear indication of the love existing between the peoples of Rwanda and Uganda.

Discussions will cover cooperation between the two countries in trade, especially barter trade, education, tourism, information and culture, energy, health for both human and animals, and transport and communications. [passage omitted]

Mandela Release in 'Next Few Weeks' Possible

*MB1909061589 Johannesburg Television Service
in English 0500 GMT 19 Sep 89*

[Text] The minister of constitutional development and planning, Dr Gerrit Viljoen, says the release of ANC [African National Congress] leader Nelson Mandela is high on the government's agenda.

In an interview with the BBC, Dr Viljoen said the release of Mr Mandela and other political prisoners will be discussed by the government in the near future. Asked if the 71-year-old ANC leader would possibly be released within the next few weeks, Dr Viljoen replied that it was possible.

In an earlier interview yesterday with the British network ITN, Dr Viljoen said he would be willing to discuss South Africa's future with Mr Mandela should the ANC leader be released and wished to take part in peaceful negotiations:

[Begin video recording] [Viljoen] I would be willing to discuss with him, and any other leaders—and there are many other leaders who have been forthcoming for discussions for many months and years already—discussing with all these leaders the future of South Africa.

[Unidentified interviewer] Is his release now imminent?

[Viljoen] I think his release is a matter which is very much high on the agenda. [end recording]

In the BBC interview, Dr Viljoen also emphasized the government's standpoint that people who wanted to take part in the negotiation process would have to qualify by committing themselves to peacefully negotiated solutions and not to violence.

He also stated clearly that he did not wish to comment on the conditions for Mr Mandela's release, but said the fewer conditions there were the better.

'Strictest Compliance' With Pact Supported

*MB1809173789 Johannesburg International Service
in English 1500 GMT 18 Sep 89*

[Text] The Governments of South Africa, Cuba, and Angola have unequivocally expressed their willingness to strive for the strictest compliance with commitments agreed to by the parties involved in the peace process in southwestern Africa.

The statement released by the joint commission of the three countries after a meeting in Havana said the delegations had examined their obligations in respect of the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435, in keeping with the agreement signed in New York in December, last year. They focused on solutions to various problems requiring priority attention in view of the nearing general election in Namibia.

Commentary Expects New Government Priorities

*MB1909064589 Johannesburg Domestic Service
in English 0500 GMT 19 Sep 89*

[Station commentary]

[Text] New emphases in government can be expected as the state president, Mr F.W. de Klerk, and his cabinet are sworn in tomorrow. The composition of the cabinet indicates that two core issues have been identified for priority attention by the new administration: They are new constitutional dispensation and problems affecting the economy.

The pressing need for a broad and representative spectrum of South African political opinion to get down to meaningful negotiations is widely felt, and the urgency of this is recognized in the formation of a strong negotiating team within the cabinet.

Dr Gerrit Viljoen, the new minister of constitutional development and planning, will spearhead the promotion of a new constitutional dispensation. His hands will be freed as much as possible to enable him to concentrate on the vital task of dialogue. Priority goals will be to find an acceptable way of identifying black leaders and to establish a basis on which there can be trust and understanding for meaningful negotiations by representatives of all South Africans that can lead to consensus on a new political and constitutional dispensation. Dr Viljoen will be supported by several other cabinet ministers, whose initiatives will be conducted under the authority and personal participation of the state president.

Backing up this fresh emphasis on dialogue and negotiations will be the contribution by Mr de Klerk to the creation of conditions for a more relaxed and stable political climate, as seen in his approach to this month's march in Cape Town and other protest action. This approach is designed to remove obstacles that political activists perceived to be a confrontationist factor as well as barrier to negotiations and to the peaceful broadening of democracy in South Africa.

As in the case of constitutional negotiation, a strong cabinet team has been formed to handle economic matters. The inclusion of a top executive from the private sector, Dr Wim de Villiers, to head the Ministry of Administration and Privatization is not only designed to strengthen the cabinet team charged with turning around the economy but also indicates a commitment by the government to the streamlining of the public service and to forceful privatization and deregulation. Dr de Villiers has also been given a special assignment to develop, in the closest cooperation with all cabinet ministers involved with economic portfolios, improved systems for coordination, monitoring, and financial management.

The problems facing constitutional and economic reform cannot be resolved overnight, but, as a new administration takes over tomorrow, it does so with the

promise of a new style of government that will lead South Africa into a period not only of decisive reform but also of renewal in the political and economic life of the country.

Radio Calls for Resumed Angolan Peace Process

*MB1809181689 Johannesburg International Service
in English 1500 GMT 18 Sep 89*

[Station commentary: "Angola"]

[Text] The latest news on Angolan peace moves is a bit disconcerting. At a time when it is vitally important for the warring factions in strife-torn Angola to work for settlement and reconciliation, there are again reports of heavy fighting in some parts of the country. It seems that the cease-fire agreement reached at Gbadolite in June between Dr Jonas Savimbi of UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola], and the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] leader, Dr Eduardo dos Santos, has just about collapsed.

In its reaction to the latest developments in Angola, the United States said during the weekend that it remains supportive of the UNITA forces in Angola. The State Department said, in a statement, it did not accept the conditions of exile, amnesty, or integration for UNITA and Dr Savimbi which Mr dos Santos seems to have read into the Gbadolite agreement. The United States supported UNITA and its goals of national reconciliation, followed by free and fair elections.

The South African defense minister, General Magnus Malan, said at the weekend that what South Africa wanted most of all in Angola was a settlement and reconciliation between the fighting parties. Gen Malan's sentiments are understandable. In the peace initiatives on southwestern Africa that resulted in the New York accords last December, two components were present. The first concerned independence for Namibia; the second, the normalization of the situation in Angola.

For almost 15 years the events in Angola have had an impact on Namibia and vice versa. The general pattern was one of confrontation and conflict in southwestern Africa. In June at Gbadolite in Zaire, President dos Santos of the governing MPLA and Dr Savimbi of UNITA shook hands and agreed to cease hostilities and to talk about national reconciliation and peace. The stability and security of southwestern Africa as a whole seems once more to be at stake. The Angolan peace process must be put firmly back on track.

16 Sep Press Review on Current Problems, Issues

MB1609122189

[Editorial Report]

SATURDAY STAR

Leaders Face Major Challenges—"The immediate future depends a great deal on a few leaders who are not

nationally dominant, and not yet well-tested. All of them," including Tutu, Boesak, and De Klerk, "came through their challenges this week with flying colours. But they have only begun to face the tests of their leadership. In any event, let the marchers march, let the rhetoric roll, provided violence is kept to a minimum," states Harvey Tyson in his "Undercurrent Affairs" column on page 10 of the Johannesburg SATURDAY STAR in English on 16 September. "F.W. has the usual 100 days to prove his good intentions. Whatever he does, it will be too fast for some, and too slow for most." Tutu and Boesak "also have major challenges to face. F.W. has deftly switched the responsibility for crowd violence on to them. They have an onerous task, for crowds easily transform into mobs, and mobs spell violence." The more successful moderates are, "the more extremists at both ends will resort to violence." Moderate leaders must "ensure that the course does not become too rough."

Marching 'Nothing New'—"The phenomenon of marching is nothing new to the age-old search and demand for rights. Gandhi did it and so did Martin Luther King. The point is that when people do not have the vote to determine their own future, they will use other means available to them. When people see marching in action, fleshed out by pain and paid for with anguish, they get caught. They become involved," asserts Joe Latakomo in his "Write On!" column on the same page. "In the final analysis, this is what all the marching is about. It is about rights: the right to fair and equal treatment," to vote, to peaceful protest, and to free speech and association. "What it says is that the time has come for apartheid to be dismantled with deliberate speed."

CITY PRESS

Mitchell's Plain Statistics Unknown—"Four days after the death of a number of people in Mitchell's Plain on election day, we still do not know the official death figure," notes the Johannesburg CITY PRESS in English on 10 September in a page 8 editorial. "Who must we believe? Law and Order Minister Adriaan Vlok and his police, or the clergymen and the community in Cape Town?" "It is not good enough for Mr Vlok to express his disgust over what he calls lies by Tutu and Boesak regarding the alleged deaths of 23 people. Mr Vlok should lift the state of emergency and remove all the media regulations so that we can report the truth as we see it," visit the state mortuary, and "set up a commission of inquiry to investigate the shooting incidents."

De Klerk Faces 'Moment of Truth'—"The general elections are over and behind us now," and "Acting State President F.W. de Klerk now faces the moment of truth. He will have to put his money where his mouth is," asserts a second editorial on the same page. "It is not good enough to have a token black person in the cabinet. This is not reform, but a mockery and an insult to the majority of the people of South Africa. What will please black South Africans is the immediate release of all

political prisoners, the unbanning of the ANC [African National Congress] and the PAC [Pan-Africanist Congress], the removal of all apartheid laws and the lifting of the state of emergency. We hope Mr de Klerk and his party will realise the importance of these demands. As far as we are concerned anything short of this will not bring lasting peace to this country."

CAPE TIMES

Indirectly Elected MP's Must Go—The concept of indirectly elected MP's was introduced "as a way of bringing people with specialised interests and expertise into Parliament"—those who "would not obtain a seat by way of an ordinary election," notes the Cape Town CAPE TIMES in English on 13 September in a page 8 editorial. "The government immediately proved its own explanation to be false by nominating party hacks and former senators to the House of Assembly. Now the system has merely become a method, for all parties, of putting defeated election candidates into Parliament." "It is more than just a slap in the face for the electorate," "it is also a further waste of taxpayers' money." "The country has more than enough parliamentarians as it is, without paying for those it democratically sent packing at the polls." "If and when a new constitution is negotiated, indirectly elected and nominated MP's should be the first to go."

Government's Financial Credibility at Stake—"The new government takes office under relatively propitious financial circumstances, for itself that is: a R10.5 billion cash mountain from buoyant revenue and borrowing far outstripping budget, also representing an acid test in which the welfare of the public should be the litmus," states a second editorial on the same page. "Government's financial credibility, and our prospects for improved standards of living hinge on the performance." "Regrettably, Mr de Klerk does not have precedent on his side for the optimistic scenario. He has presumably been an influential party to the kind of decisionmaking which has seen the squandering of our vast gold wealth and a crippling tax burden in the name of big government. Fortunately, it is not too late to get priorities right."

De Klerk's Media Honeymoon—The media in many Western countries "tend to allow new political leaders a honeymoon to settle down before subjecting them to scrutiny," observes Anthony Johnson in his "Midweek Politics" column on page 6. Although De Klerk "has been allowed a surprising degree of latitude," "the many people who have allowed the NP's [National Party] 'new action, new vision' man extra licence must surely now be questioning their wisdom." Was De Klerk "showing his true colors" when he conceded "that even people of colour could be 'responsible'"—a statement that "must have outraged the black leaders with whom Mr de Klerk is expected to negotiate"—or when, earlier this year, he "set off alarm bells by stating that if key pieces of apartheid legislation were scrapped 'chaos' would ensue."

Cape Town March Deserves Congratulations—"Yesterday was an historic day for Cape Town and South Africa. The Mother City can be proud of itself. Given the opportunity, and the conspicuous absence of the riot police, citizens demonstrated convincingly that a protest march of thousands can take place in South Africa in good order and discipline," declares the 14 September CAPE TIMES in a page 10 editorial. "Congratulations are in order." "This was not a sideshow of radicals and activists. It was a cross-section of the community declaring that Cape Town had had enough of lawless violence of all kinds." "Nationally, the outcome of yesterday's march was a triumph for the incoming State President, Mr F.W. de Klerk. His decision to allow it to take place was statesmanlike, overriding the conventional wisdom of the security establishment." It was also "an important psychological victory, not least over the die-hard sections of the police," and "an important propaganda victory which will gain him valuable time." "It seems that the De Klerk era may be different. Let us hope so."

ILANGA

De Klerk Must 'Act Now'—"Action taken against protesters in the Cape prints an ugly and disgusting picture, blotting the name of South Africa on the world scene," states the 14-16 September Durban ILANGA in Zulu in a page 4 editorial. "There are not yet any indications that the National Party, led by Mr F.W. de Klerk, has learned anything from the previous party leaders' big mistakes. One of these mistakes was banning the ANC," an act that caused the "unending conflict we have today." "This same muzzling of the ANC led to the formation of the United Democratic Front, whose subsequent banning led to the formation of the Mass Democratic Movement, which, like the Nationalists, does not have massive support in the country and is not in the will of the people." The NP must "institute negotiations between all groups," as this will "end the endless conflict seen on the streets." "Mr F.W. de Klerk should take the necessary steps now, or there will be an escalation of violence and an increase in groups that oppose him, and he will have a major crisis on his hands. Mr de Klerk has no alternative but to act now."

18 Sep Press Review

MB1809114289

[Editorial Report]

SUNDAY STAR

De Klerk Departure From 'Heavy Handed' Approach—Johannesburg SUNDAY STAR in English on 17 September in its page 14 editorial comments on the protest marches in Johannesburg and Cape Town this week for which government permission was granted, saying F.W. de Klerk "must be commended for departing from the heavy handed approach of his predecessors." Also, "the fact that this week's marches were such a big event is indicative of how far down the road to totalitarianism

South Africa has travelled." There are also "a host of apartheid laws which still render South Africans unequal. A few protest marches do not alter the fundamental system which governs our lives. Until that system is changed, South Africa will be no closer to a new tomorrow." SUNDAY STAR believes the "journey ahead" depends "largely on Mr de Klerk." "His only option is to manage the process of change, harness the energies of those applying the pressure and proceed as quickly as possible. Some diplomats are already referring to Mr de Klerk's new air of 'glasnost'. It is too early to judge the State President's brave new world and Mr de Klerk has no time to waste. The window of opportunity is open but it will not remain so for long."

Columnist Notes 'Apartheid' Killings—Jon Qwelane writes in his "Just Jon" column on page 10 he believes South-West Africa People's Organization [SWAPO] official Anton Lubowski, and South-West Africa Police Constable Willem Nel "were killed by apartheid." "The reason I blame apartheid for the two deaths is the same as I find for the mayhem that has plagued our townships in South Africa in the past few weeks. We have gone a dangerously long way down the destructive path where 'tradition' and the law of the land demarcated us into white and black camps." "As long as apartheid remains the order of the day, deliberately ingrained in the minds of many people, so long will we continue the indefensible violence such as we witnessed this week. The obvious needs repeating: Apartheid is violent, and needs violence to prop it up because there is no other way to defend or even justify it."

SUNDAY TIMES

'No Turning Back' on Negotiations—On page 24 of Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES in English on 17 September, Harald Pakendorf writes that "Mr de Klerk is already faced by an overlap of pre-negotiation demands; an overlap of negotiating positions is developing; there are high expectations (here and abroad) that major moves are afoot; it is NP policy to begin talks; there is clearly a political, economic and law-and-order need to negotiate." Pakendorf believes De Klerk will begin moving on this front but, "like the porcupine, will soon find out that once he has started burrowing there is no turning back. The porcupine's quills scrape against the side of the tunnel and make turning back impossible."

De Klerk Places Discipline Onus on Demonstrators—"Recognition of the right of peaceful, orderly protest was an act of strength, not weakness," observes a page 26 editorial. "Perhaps the most significant aspect of events on the streets this week was the grasp displayed by Mr de Klerk of the principle of accountability. By placing the onus on the demonstrators—not on the SAP [South African Police]—to keep their promises to be peaceful, he shifted the responsibility for discipline. And that is where it belongs." "It is a principle that must be carried through to constitutional and other matters. For too long those who demand political change have relied almost solely on the slogans of protest politics to draw attention

to their legitimate grievances. Rarely has one heard (except in recent, fairly hastily compiled ANC document) many specifics of the alternative they envisage in the post-apartheid society."

THE CITIZEN

De Klerk Appoints More 'Caring' Government—Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English on 18 September in its page 6 editorial congratulates F.W. de Klerk "on choosing a very well-balanced Cabinet and one that confirms his new-style leadership." Besides putting together a team that is "politically strong" De Klerk has "issued two main signals." "The one is that reform is, indeed, a priority. The other is that he intends to streamline the public service and to ensure that privatisation is successfully implemented." "The De Klerk era is going to ensure more efficient and caring government, while moving the country along the road to a new South Africa."

THE STAR

Guard Against Namibian White Extremist Violence—Johannesburg THE STAR in English on 18 September in a page 10 editorial says those behind the murder of SWAPO official, Anton Lubowski, "were probably white extremists. If this is true nothing could be more ominous. Such groups have long existed in Namibia, which remains in many ways a violent frontier society. Some people smoulder with resentment at what they see as Pretoria's capitulation." Therefore, "Pretoria must be especially alert for any signs of extremist support emanating from this country. SWAPO and the UN will be only too ready to blame any such troubles on South Africa. To complete its task of quitting Namibia, South Africa must be seen to be leaving with clean hands."

BUSINESS DAY

Cabinet Appointments Suggest 5 Years of 'Reconstruction'—"In nominating his Cabinet, President-elect De Klerk has selected the most verligte [enlightened] cohort of Nationalist leaders ever chosen to govern this country," remarks Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English on 18 September in its page 10 editorial. De Klerk has "put into strategic positions two hand-picked men of great ability to carry out special tasks of reconstruction: Wim de Villiers [minister for administration and privatization] to carry out (at long last!) the rationalisation of the crushing bureaucracy, and Gerrit Viljoen [minister of constitutional development and planning and of national education]." "This is a verligte reform Cabinet, not a Cabinet planning to abdicate. The retention of Magnus Malan as Defence Minister and Adriaan Vlok as Minister of Police perhaps makes the point. One of President de Klerk's first problems will be to mute the absurdly overblown expectations which have been created with the intention, one suspects, that they will be disappointed. That said, the appointments suggest five years of fundamental reconstruction under the Nationalist leader."

SOWETAN

Paper Calls for Vlok Demotion—"The retention of Mr Adriaan Vlok as Minister of Law and Order despite demands that he be thrown out of the Cabinet is a strong indication of the real Mr F.W. de Klerk," says the page 6 editorial in Johannesburg SOWETAN in English on 18 September. "Just a few days ago many were singing De Klerk's praises after he had allowed the marches in Pretoria, Grahamstown, Johannesburg and Cape Town. The meaningful thing for him to have done would have been to either sack or demote Vlok after the recent row over the behaviour of some members of the police force." "It is now clear that he wants to sell himself to the country and the international community as a liberal man when in fact he is no better than his predecessors."

RAPPORT

NP Must Seek To Accommodate Aspirations of All People—A page 32 editorial in Johannesburg RAPPORT in Afrikaans on 17 September says the NP "must express the aspirations of its people, but in the process also seek room for the aspirations of others. It has committed itself to creating a community where this can be realized, and now it must stand or fall by this." However, it is "heartening to note the NP is approaching this task with a fire that has long been absent from its actions. It is also good that the task is being approached soberly." "A heavy responsibility rests on the government to bring the people to accept the consequences of their choices on 6 September. An equal responsibility rests with the leaders of the voteless masses, who are turning to protest marches, to draw their people away from the path of fruitless conflict. If both sides do what is in the interest of all the people in the country, the new South Africa that appears to be so far, can probably be brought much nearer."

TRANSVALER

Democratic Party Leadership Dilemma—Johannesburg TRANSVALER in Afrikaans on 13 September notes in a page 6 editorial the Democratic Party's (DP) postponement of electing a leader "is of little concern to us" but it "confirms our initial standpoint that the DP's composition is fragile." "The fact that the party has to get rid of its trileadership because of the road ahead, shows the old separating elements are coming to the fore again." "The decision was again postponed yesterday. But it will only worsen the problem because the competing camps will get a chance to reorganize themselves."

Protest March 'Tension' in Cape Town—"Many South Africans yesterday were tense during the march in Cape Town," says Johannesburg TRANSVALER in Afrikaans on 14 September in a page 8 editorial. "If talks before the march among church leaders contributed to the peaceful outcome, then there is hope. It is proof that the church and its congregation have a duty to bridge the gap between despair and conflict on the one hand, and hope and anticipation on the other hand." "A new dispensation cannot succeed if the disposition among population

groups doesn't change. With respect to the latter, the church and its leaders have a considerable contribution to make and create an example how groups could live together in harmony." "Also, the government's new approach yesterday to the march, gradually reduced tension."

Achieving Peace More Difficult Than War—A second editorial on the same page says "to achieve peace is sometimes more difficult than to declare war." "Now, it is again the case in South-West Africa/Namibia and Angola, where relentless efforts to keep the peace process on track were this week threatened by the gun." "In South-West Africa/Namibia, Resolution 435 balances on the edge of a knife following the assassination of a white official in the SWAPO leadership corps. This follows only a few days after a white constable was killed while carrying out his duties. Soon afterwards, a couple of whites were arrested in connection with the attack on the UNTAG [United Nations Transition Assistance Group] base."

BEELD

Government 'Bold Step' To Allow March—"The government took a bold and significant decision to allow yesterday's Cape Town mass march without police presence," asserts Johannesburg BEELD in Afrikaans on 14 September in a page 14 editorial. "The fact that thousands of people at last could peacefully march through the streets of their mother city, is of utmost significance and a historic victory for peace in South Africa." "It is an indication that the new spirit under the leadership of Mr F.W. de Klerk is taking root. It gives hope for the future."

Lubowski Killing—In a second editorial on the same page BEELD notes "just when it appeared that Namibia was well on the track to peaceful independence, comes this dastardly assassination on Tuesday 12 September, of a senior SWAPO member, Advocate Anton Lubowski." "With Namibia on the straight to independence, this kind of anarchy is the last thing this disrupted country can tolerate. What confidence can it create if political leaders who are to sit at the negotiation table are eliminated before their hard-earned freedom?" "Everything should be done to avoid anarchists polluting the climate of peaceful negotiations"

Criticism of Nujoma Return to Namibia—Referring to SWAPO's "terrorist struggle" as "the world's most unsuccessful liberation struggle," Johannesburg BEELD in Afrikaans on 15 September in a page 10 editorial says: "After all these years SWAPO cannot make any claims on any single centimeter of Namibian soil." Upon his return SWAPO leader Sam Nujoma "dramatically kissed the ground. The same ground that was developed through hard work by those who stayed behind while he, and a chosen few in their luxurious homes abroad, planned murder and destruction for the inhabitants of the country—white, colored and black."

TIMES OF NAMIBIA

'Team Effort' Required To Continue After Lubowski Murder—A page 3 editorial in Windhoek TIMES OF NAMIBIA in English on 13 September reads: "The death of Anton Lubowski is to be condemned by all, no matter what their political persuasion. It is at moments like this that words fail. This country has bled enough. The war took its heavy toll, not only in human lives but also in goodwill among the people of a divided country. This death could not have come at a more inopportune time, when we had concrete hope that peace would come. His death came at the stage when all political groupings accepted independence. This country had everything going for it, with international backing for independence. Each political grouping was, in its own way, working towards this long-awaited goal. This death, deplorable beyond words and incomprehensible as it may be, cannot be allowed to grind the independence process to a halt. The death of Mr Lubowski is the second political killing within two days. In Otjiwarongo Constable Willie Nel died on Sunday [10 Sep] night. These deaths cannot be allowed to instigate a new reign of terror. Too much is at stake: the end to those ethnic, socio-economic lines which have torn our country apart. Let us hope this cowardly and ghastly deed will not prevent the SWAPO President, Mr Sam Nujoma, from coming home. This is time to show the world that we can go on with our business, and going on will require a team effort. But let us at all costs avoid hurling accusations at each other in the heat of the moment. Until time and retrospection allow for clarity, let us be united in our disgust. This newspaper wishes to express its condolences to Mr Lubowski's dear ones and to his Party colleagues."

*** Malan Announces Allowance for Border Farmers**

34000802b Johannesburg THE CITIZEN
in English 17 Aug 89 p 23

[Article by Darene Rothschild]

[Text] A security allowance of R500 a month is to be paid to farmers in designated areas for the country's border areas, the Minister of Defence, General Magnus Malan announced yesterday.

The allowance will be administered by the South African Defence Force to encourage full-time occupation of the farms in the border areas, with a view to discouraging terrorist infiltration through them, Gen Malan said.

"By encouraging full-time occupation of these farms, the task of the Defence Force will be made easier because less manpower will be needed for patrolling these areas."

The Cabinet had given approval for the security allowances to be retrospective to April 1.

As the allowance was of a capital nature, it would be not-taxable.

Gen Malan said the security allowances would replace the area allowances, paid by the Minister Council of the Administration of the House of Assembly, which had been stopped at the end of March.

In order for farmers to qualify for the allowances various requirements would have to be met, one being that the farmer would have to live and sleep permanently on his farm.

The farmer must also have a marnet radio system by means of which security forces would be informed of any suspicious movements in the area.

A further requirement was that if the farmer had national service obligations, he would have to be an active member of a commando or the Citizen Force.

Gen Malan said a person with a daytime job who returned nightly to his farm, but was helped by his family and employees to meet the requirements, could also qualify for the allowance.

Where an owner was permanently absent but had a full-time White foreman, the foreman could qualify for the allowance if he met the requirements and provided that the owner of the farm was aware of the negotiations for the allowance.

*** Trade Figures Show 'Booming' Export Industry**

34000802a Johannesburg THE STAR (finance)
in English 16 Aug 89 p 15

[Article by Derek Tommey]

[Text] The export industry continues to boom.

Exports in July totalled R5.16 billion, customs figures show.

Although this is a drop of R564.5 million from June's record R5.7 billion, it is the second-highest monthly figure to be achieved and an increase of 22 percent on a year ago.

It brought export earnings in the first seven months of the year to R32.5 billion, an increase of R5.8 billion, or nearly 21 percent, on the R26.7 billion earned in the same period last year.

However, imports also boomed in July, amounting to R4.07 billion, reflecting the strong demand for raw materials and capital goods.

Although this is R369.7 million less than June's R4.42 billion, it is still the second-highest recorded.

Imports in the seven months to July were R26.1 billion, an increase of R4.6 billion on a year ago.

These export and import figures indicate a strong economy despite the authorities' efforts to cool business activities, to reduce imports and improve the balance of payments.

Nonetheless, the trade surplus in July was a creditable R1.09 billion.

Although below June's record R1.29 billion, it brought the surplus for the first seven months to R6.4 billion.

This is 24 percent higher than the R5.17 billion after the first seven months of last year.

Bruce Donald, Safto's economist, attributes the strength of exports to the lower rand exchange rate, which is assisting their competitiveness abroad.

Strong international demand, higher commodity prices and bumper farm crops are helping to improve export earnings, he says.

Effect

He expects further strong growth in exports and says the full effect of the falling rand will be fully reflected only as the year progresses.

Mr Donald says that the value of vegetable exports has risen 90 percent, precious and semi-precious stones (mostly diamonds) 61 percent, base metals 55 percent, chemical exports 40 percent and non-gold minerals, including coal, 34 percent.

Unclassified exports, including gold, rose by under two percent.

* Black Boycott Hits OFS Conservatives

34000799c Johannesburg SOWETAN
in English 11 Aug 89 p 4

[Text] A new black consumer boycott against Conservative Party [CP] businesses has erupted—this time in the small Free State town of Parys on the Vaal River.

Although Parys—unlike Boksburg and Carletonville—does not have a CP-controlled town council, boycotters have identified CP businesses in the town and have begun to withdraw their custom. A list surfaced in Parys this week identifying about 36 businesses—including one medical practice and two or three legal practices—owned by CP supporters.

According to residents of the town the list has been circulating in the black areas of Parys.

The managers of a pharmacy named on the list said yesterday that several black customers holding accounts with them, had been in this week to close them.

They were convinced that the National Party [NP] was responsible for drawing up the list.

NP election workers denied this. However, one said: "That's what should happen—boycott the right people."

Officials at the CP's election office said—without naming the NP—that the boycott was "a clear sign that the CP was winning the election in Parys and that certain instances were trying to disadvantage the CP."

* Soweto Students, Teachers Fear Thugs

34000799b Johannesburg SOWETAN
in English 11 Aug 89 p 4

[Article by Phangisile Mtshali: "Blackboard Jungle"]

[Text] While politically motivated class disruptions and boycotts seem to decrease in Soweto schools, thuggery and disorder have set in as gun-toting pupils threaten the lives of teachers and fellow-pupils.

Tension has been running high at a number of Soweto high schools in the past few weeks, particularly in Diepkloof where there have been class disruptions in some instances.

Pupils at Naledi High School recently attacked two teachers with pick handles and baseball bats.

Several principals in Diepkloof are reported to have received threatening letters ordering them "to stop oppressing comrades."

The beginning of 1989 has seen assaults on teachers by students becoming a common practice.

Pupils have been shot in school premises, two of them fatally, while knife-fights and rape incidents have also been reported at different schools.

"Teaching in Soweto is like sitting on a time bomb," a Soweto high school teacher, who may not be named for fear of victimisation, said.

"We have to watch our mouths and actions to avoid being branded 'sell outs.' We can no longer carry out our disciplinary duties.

"Before the 1986 class boycotts the teaching profession was a challenge: we felt we were doing something for the nation and the children were prepared to learn," he said.

"Now they are not interested in their studies, they are unresponsive and one gets no feedback from them. They have a negative attitude towards their studies."

Students can be classified into three sections: those who are interested in their studies, those who attend lessons but never pay any attention and those who are always in the school yard but never inside the classroom.

The school disorders are a matter of concern and parents have formed committees to solve the problems.

Youth and students organisations have also pointed to the negative achievements of the three year schools boycotts.

"While the Department of Education and Training [DET]'s refusal to consult with students and parents organisations is the main cause of school chaos, previous class boycotts without alternative tuition have always contributed to the chaos," Azanian Students Movement publicity secretary Mr Sipho Maseko, said.

"The slogan 'Liberation Now, Education Later' also confused students who are not yet liberated and their young minds were made generally susceptible to be hostile towards education.

"Boycotts were previously taken as a principle and not as a strategy. Students were pulled out of school to pursue liberation as if it was around the corner," he added.

A spokesman for Action Youth, Mr Salim Valli, said the early 1980's boycotts should be taken as a lesson and should not be allowed to degenerate into mindless violence and thuggery.

"Boycott is a powerful weapon and it must be used wisely, mostly as a last resort," he said.

"Schools are the site of struggle. We must turn them into centres of liberation and not surrender them to the enemy through irresponsible behaviour and thuggery. The present educational system should be challenged to prepare our youth for the labour market."

The DET Regional Director, Mr Peet Struwig, attributed classroom thuggery and disorder to demotivation.

"Soweto students need motivation such as job opportunities," he said. "We have enough schools to educate Sowetans but what do they do with that education?" Frustration suffered by jobless graduates can turn them into criminals and it can demotivate those still at school.

"Classroom thuggery is not educational problem, it is a reflection of the frustration and anger caused by the social, economic, and political state of blacks," he said.

* Black Groups Present Views on Negotiations

* BCMA's Mangena

34000801 Johannesburg SOWETAN
in English 10 Aug 89 p 6

[Article: "Talks Will Split Liberation Movement"]

[Text] The word "negotiation" is on everybody's lips today. Some people are pushing for a negotiated settlement for this country and others are saying the National Party [NP] has not shown that it is interested in genuine negotiations. With this background information, Mathatha Tsedu last week spoke to the leaders of South African liberation movements during a visit to Zimbabwe. He spoke to Mosibudi Mangena, chairman of the Black Consciousness Movement of Azania, and Johnson Mlambo, chairman of the Pan Africanist Congress. The ANC [African National Congress]'s chief representative in Harare was not available.

Black people should not be fooled by the whirlwind of talk by liberal whites and their lackeys that whites were about to hand over power to the majority.

Instead, the oppressed black majority should gear themselves to struggle further and increase their resolve.

This is the view of the Black Consciousness Movement of Azania (BCMA), expressed by the organisation's chairman, Mr Mosibudi Mangena, in an exclusive interview in Harare, Zimbabwe, last week.

The much publicised Tuynhuis tea party between State President P.W. Botha and African National Congress leader, Nelson Mandela was among the issues looked at.

It also covered the possibility of talks between the ANC and the National Party of F. W. de Klerk and how these developments would affect the BCMA and other socialist forces presently pitted against the regime.

Mangena said the BCMA would only go into negotiations if it was accepted by the Government that one man one vote and the redistribution of wealth was the solution.

"We do not think there is any sense in talking about freedom and democracy without the redistribution of wealth. They presently own about 90 percent of the land and freedom without redistribution would simply make us free beggars in our own country," Mangena said.

Mangena said moves to force blacks into "premature" negotiations with the Government are mainly a result of the change in foreign policy of the Soviet Union.

The meeting between Botha and Mandela was "a mischievous act" by Botha and the National Party.

"We cannot see what that little meeting will do to address the problems of black people. Mandela is a prisoner. He is not free. Besides the desire expressed to resolve the conflict in occupied Azania, nothing of substance regarding the aspirations and demands of our people was discussed.

Change is not brought about by drinking tea with a prisoner, but by freeing people," Mangena said.

Mangena said white liberals were using their money and influence within multi-racial organisations to entrench capitalism. He said Idasa, which has been spearheading the safaris to the ANC in Lusaka and Dakar, had not contacted the BCMA for a meeting.

"We do not even anticipate their contact," he said.

None of the Western countries that have been linked to talks—Britain, France and Canada—had contacted the BCMA about such moves.

He said the Frontline States, reportedly putting pressure on liberation movements to enter into negotiations with the minority Government, had not put any pressure on the BCMA to start talks.

"We have not found any change in attitude in the countries that we interact with," Mangena said.

Asked about the prospect of a successful armed struggle without rear bases in neighbouring countries, Mangena,

who is also commander in chief of the Azanian Liberation Army (Azania), said conditions in Southern Africa were "difficult" but not impossible.

Mangena said the BCMA was convinced that there would be "a lot of hullabaloo after September 6 about these so-called talks."

"But we do not think that anything will be achieved because the Boers are still very arrogant. All they are interested in is the maintenance of white supremacy and the retention of their privileges."

He said the BCMA believed there were a number of possibilities that could arise after September 6. These included:

- Britain as mediator in bringing parties together for talks. This would be supported by the Soviets.
- De Klerk, if his party fared badly with the right wing making inroads, may ditch the idea of talks. The BCMA believes however that this is unlikely.
- The Nationalist Party might stick to its "pathetic and insulting" package presented recently and challenge the black community to take it or leave it. "Puppets in the bantustans, in local government, who have formed the so-called National Forum, and those in the tri-cameral Parliament would accept the package and enter into negotiations with the National Party."

"A negotiating process might start, with a variation of actors, so as to split the broad liberation movement. This will seek to exclude, isolate and marginalise the BC Movement in its entirety, the Pan Africanist Congress and any section of the Charterist camp which is not amenable to shameful compromises."

The recent Mandela-Botha meeting might be an attempt at this. The BCMA believes that white liberals and academics who have been trudging to Lusaka for talks with the ANC would prefer this option.

"A process in which all the three main tendencies of the liberation movement are involved may start. It is an unlikely scenario," Mangena emphasised, but "even if this situation comes about, the regime believing in its strength, at the present time, is likely to be most intransigent."

"The talks are likely to collapse without achieving anything."

Mangena, saying the struggle for a socialist order in the country would continue irrespective of the talks, added that there was certainly nothing on the ground to suggest that whites are ready to countenance a "democratic order in Azania."

The only "possible value of engaging in negotiations with the Boers at the present time, would be to demonstrate the intransigence of the racist white regime in value of engaging in negotiations with the Boers at the present time, would be to demonstrate the intransigence of the racist white regime in Pretoria."

"It is doubtful whether time and energy should be invested in an exercise whose results are so negligible," he said.

* PAC's Mlambo

34000801 Johannesburg SOWETAN
in English 11 Aug 89 p 6

[Article: "PAC Has Not Taken Position on Negotiation"]

[Text] Negotiation is a topical concept in South African politics today. In the second of a two-part series, Mathatha Tsedu reports on an interview with the chairman of the Pan Africanist Congress, Johnson Mlambo.

The storm that generated after the Nelson Mandela-P.W. Botha meeting at Tuynhys last month and the talk about talks are indications that the imperialist powers want to subvert the liberation struggle.

The ultimate aim of the moves is to secure capitalist interests and not to democratise the country.

This was said by the chairman of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) in an interview in Harare, Zimbabwe, last week.

The interview was conducted taking into account the background of recent political developments which have led to speculation on possible talks aimed at defusing the situation in the country.

PAC Stand

Mlambo said the struggle being waged by the PAC was for the return of the land "stolen from our forefathers". He said the PAC would enter talks with the Government only if it indicated its willingness to "transfer power to the oppressed and dispossessed."

"Only then would we be prepared to entertain the notion of negotiations. We however believe the regime is not ready for the transfer of power. They are still very arrogant and very racist. Only when they are cornered will they perhaps be prepared to negotiate."

Mlambo said the meeting between State President Botha and ANC [African National Congress] leader Mandela was a result of inner party struggle.

"Botha is hitting back at those who pushed him out. We cannot however say there is no political significance to the meeting."

No Moves

He said the PAC had not taken any position on whether to attend any talks if and when they are held.

"The regime has not made any such overtures to us. But should they do, then the overtures would be discussed by

the Central Committee and any other people that we feel a need to consult with," he said.

He said the Institute for a Democratic Alternative to South Africa (Idasa), which has spearheaded moves to bring whites in contact with the ANC, had approached the PAC for a meeting, but it had not materialised yet.

He said the United Kingdom and the United States of America had approached his organisation and offered to act as intermediaries between the PAC and the National Party.

Denial

He denied that Canada had also offered its "assistance" to the organisation.

Mlambo said several commentators had said the implementation of UN Resolution 435 in Namibia was a prelude to a similar situation in "occupied Azania".

"The regime suffered military defeat in Angola during the battle for Cuito Cuanavale. This—brought about by the heroic battles for the people of Angola and Namibia—led to the retreat. Hence the implementation of 435 in Namibia. But the regime is still feeling strong on the home front and is not necessarily about to abdicate."

He said the Frontline States, contrary to reports in the media, had not put any pressure on his organisation to enter talks. "The Frontline States are naturally interested in the solution of the South African problem as it is the source of destabilisation in the region. But they are not forcing us into any negotiations.

"It is true that the Frontline States are making huge sacrifices. They are victims of destabilisation. All I know is that like any reasonable people anywhere, they encourage us to follow and pursue all means—peaceful as well as armed struggle."

Mlambo said the armed struggle remained the main form of struggle that could bring the present settler regime down.

The recent upsurge in activities by the Azanian People's Army (Apla) was one of the reasons why the imperialists were now actively advising the Nationalist Party to enter talks with organisations such as the ANC.

Asked how the PAC hoped to wage a successful armed struggle without rear bases, Mlambo said it was possible to "have bases in the hearts and minds of our people."

Input

"There are countries that fought struggles successfully without rear bases and external facilities. The input by our own people in the country is much more important than rear bases," he said.

If external bases are not important, why had the PAC military wing not made significant impact?

Mlambo said the Poqo insurrection in 1959 and the recent skirmishes with Apla fighters were considerable gains made "by people who fought gallantly".

Disputes

Mlambo said superpowers were co-operating in settling disputes the world over. He said the PAC however believed that the struggle is for the oppressed and exploited majority.

"Our mission is to mobilise and galvanise the masses into an irresistible force that will overthrow the settler regime that rules over our people illegally and illegitimately.

In this context, the present manoeuvres are useless and only aimed at subverting the armed struggle and protecting settler and imperialist interests," Mlambo said.

* Communist Party Spells Out New Program

34000799a Braamfontein WORK IN PROGRESS
in English Aug/Sep 89 pp 19-23

[Interview with SACP leadership by David Niddrie, date and place not given; first paragraph WORK IN PROGRESS comment]

[Text] The South African Communist Party [SACP] recently adopted a new programme at its congress earlier this year. It also claimed a massive 90 percent increase in membership since its last congress, held in 1984. In the interests of understanding the SACP's policies, David Niddrie submitted a series of questions to the party's leadership. The positions expressed here by the SACP, as with all articles in WORK IN PROGRESS [WIP], do not reflect the policies or principles of WIP's editorial collective, but are published in the interests of debate on South Africa's future.

[WORK IN PROGRESS] South African Communist Party membership grew by 90 percent between the 1984 and 1989 party congresses. What caused this increase in support for the party?

[SACP] The post-1984 ferment was accompanied by an all-round spurt of both legal and illegal radical opposition. Trade union and working-class consciousness spread considerably, with a special focus on a future socialist alternative.

The party benefitted in two ways: as part of its alliance with the ANC [African National Congress], and as the symbol of anti-capitalism. The raising of our flag beside that of the ANC, and pro-party songs and slogans, were mostly initiatives taken on the ground, not prepared by party structures.

But our growth was also the fruit of underground political interventions and the spread of our propaganda and agitational material, which struck a chord among activists. The party's appeal also grew as a result of a shift away from dogmatism and narrow styles of work.

We aim to increase our strength even further, but are not a mass party. Bearing in mind considerations of quality and security, we need to temper growth with caution.

Our recent party congress recorded that progress has been at the cost not only of effort but also of sacrifice. Twenty-two party members were killed in combat or died in the course of duty between the 1984 and 1989 congresses.

[WORK IN PROGRESS] Has there been a shift in the class and racial make-up of party membership?

[SACP] The party's racial composition is 70 percent African, 16 percent white, 10 percent Indian and 4 percent coloured. This reflects the sort of balance which has been in our party since the late 1920s.

The working-class component of membership was negatively affected in the post-Rivonia period when the party's underground was decimated and structures had to be recreated externally with the aim of getting back into the situation. The bulk of those who came abroad for political and military training were students and intellectuals in origin, some of whom joined the party.

This explains the contrasting external and internal class statistics noted by our seventh congress. Seventy-five percent of membership outside is made up of ex-students, professionals and the intelligentsia, while 25 percent is comprised of ex-workers. In our underground, close to 75 percent of membership is working class.

A negative feature which our congress resolved to rectify is that women make up only 16 percent of our membership.

[WORK IN PROGRESS] What are the main changes between your 1962 programme, 'The road to South African Freedom', and your new programme, 'The Path to Power'?

[SACP] The world, our region and South Africa itself have undergone major transformations in the last 27 years. Both the descriptive and analytical content of the SACP's programme needed clarification, updating and adjustment to reflect developments. The new programme comes to terms with the reality that the instability of modern capitalism and the crises which surface from time to time do not lead to its automatic collapse; the relations of production have not, as previously predicted, stood in the way of impressive technological growth.

Whilst asserting socialism's enormous potential for all-round progress, attention is also drawn to its serious deformations which led to stagnation, criminal violations of justice and extensive departures from democratic norms.

Some lessons gained from attempts in Africa to prepare conditions for an advance to socialism are touched upon. The main error is identified as the drive to move ahead of objective conditions both in economic and political

policy. Premature attempts to eliminate the whole private sector have often resulted in the narrowing of the social base of the revolution and have harmed the quest for socialism.

The great changes in Southern Africa, their impact on our struggle, Pretoria's policy of destabilisation and its pursuit of regional domination, are also examined.

Closer to home, the programme clarifies a number of our party's key perceptions such as the thesis of colonialism of a special type (CST) and the relation between national-democratic and socialist transformation. In some cases—such as our concept of vanguardism—there are distinct departures from the previous programme. This reflects new approaches which have been evolving over the past 27 years.

The chapter on the 'Path to Power' is largely innovative. The 1962 programme did not deal with this aspect in a structured way and the fact that we were called upon to do so now is a measure of the more promising potential in the situation.

[WORK IN PROGRESS] Is the concept of colonialism of a special type in the 1989 programme anything more than a rehash of the old 1962 position?

[SACP] The programmatic development of CST in 1962 was an important theoretical advance for our party and for the broad national liberation movement. The concept now enjoys wide currency within the ANC and in the ranks of the mass democratic movement (MDM).

In preparing ourselves for the seventh congress and for the new party programme, CST was subjected to the closest scrutiny by our membership, taking into account various criticisms which the concept has attracted.

There was general consensus in our ranks that the 1962 formulation was not always sufficiently precise, more especially in its treatment of the relationship between the concept and class analysis, and therefore class struggle. Some critics of CST have maintained that it conceals the fact of bourgeois rule in our country. This criticism is fuelled by a number of imprecisions in the 1962 outline of CST. For instance, there is a mention of a 'white nation', while the majority are referred to as the 'oppressed people' which, in some interpretations, conjures up the existence of a second 'black nation'.

The 1962 programme does spell out the class divisions which cut across the national divide, but there are moments of ambiguity which could be understood as giving the latter emphasis almost to the exclusion of the former. This blunts the specificity of CST as a variant of bourgeois class domination.

In the new programme CST is more firmly subordinated to a class analysis of our situation and is treated as a variant of bourgeois domination. There is no abstract model of a capitalist society. Historically, bourgeois class

rule has been exercised through different kinds of domination within different concrete societies. The bourgeoisie has also exerted its rule across frontiers. We locate the concept of CST within this broad family of variants, ranging from bourgeois democracy to fascism, from colonialism to neo-colonial rule.

CST is a South African variant of bourgeois domination exerted internally within a single social formation but exhibiting many of the features of bourgeois domination across frontiers.

The new programme considers the historical origins of the variant of bourgeois class rule, and the factors underlying its perpetuation. We note that this pattern of domination has been maintained, albeit through changing mechanisms, with many internal contradictions and counter tendencies.

However, the essence of our approach remains intact: CST is the mode in which bourgeois domination is exercised in our country, ensuring that all classes which make up the privileged group benefit, albeit unequally and in different ways, from this special type of internal colonialism.

Conversely, all black classes suffer national oppression, in varying degrees and in different ways, and their colonial status has, broadly speaking, remained in place after the end of classical colonial rule. This reality is a matter of substance and not just of form. It lies at the very root of our political responses, providing the theoretical foundation for the conclusions that the main content of the immediate struggle is national liberation.

The most consistent group among those who have dug in against the CST thesis maintain that the socialist revolution is immediately on the agenda and that the CST thesis diverts us towards the false perspective of the national democratic revolution.

In the case of other critics of CST, events of the last five years have brought many of them closer to a realisation of the dominant place of the national liberation struggle in the present phase. They need to ask themselves whether it is not precisely the CST thesis which provides the theoretical basis for such a view, and stop dismissing it purely out of habit.

[WORK IN PROGRESS] In what way has your approach on vanguardism been re-examined?

[SACP] The party's claim to represent the historic aspirations of our working class does not, in itself, give us inherent leadership rights either now or in the future; it merely imposes leadership obligations. Our new programme asserts that a communist party does not earn the title of vanguard merely by proclaiming it.

Nor does its claim to be the upholder of Marxism-Leninism give it a monopoly of political wisdom or a natural right to exclusive control of the struggle. We can only win our place as a vanguard force by superior efforts of leadership and devotion to the revolutionary cause.

This approach to the vanguard concept has not always been adhered to in world revolutionary practice. It was undoubtedly one of the most serious casualties in the divide which developed between socialism and democracy—a divide which not only distorted the inner life of working-class parties but also led to the exercise of commandism and bureaucracy over society as a whole.

It would be idle to claim that we ourselves were not infected with this distortion, but the shift which has taken place is not a post-Gorbachev phenomenon. The wording of our new programme on this question is taken almost verbatim from our March 1970 central committee report on organisation. This document reiterated the need to safeguard, both in the letter and the spirit, the independence of political expressions of other social forces, whether economic or national. We exercise a vanguard role in relation to trade unions, not by transforming them into instruments of the party and engaging in intrigue, but by striving to give guidance in what we consider to be in the best interest of their members; and by individual communists winning respect as the most loyal, devoted and ideologically clear members. The same principle was stressed in relation to the national movement.

In short, the concept of vanguard remains in place. It is indispensable for the working class to have an independent political instrument which safeguards its role in the democratic revolution and which leads it towards a classless society. But such leadership must be won rather than asserted. And it must guard against conflating democratic dissent with counter revolution. On balance, the SACP has moved towards these positions both theoretically and in its revolutionary practices.

[WORK IN PROGRESS] You use the words 'on balance'. Are you saying that there are still murky areas?

[SACP] Our programme recognises that the commandist and bureaucratic approaches which took root during Stalin's time affected communist parties around the world, including our own. And it would be naive to imagine that a movement can, at a stroke, shed all the mental baggage it has carried from the past. This is a process calling for ongoing vigilance and re-examination.

Our congress noted some isolated reversions. The central committee report emphatically rejected the old purist concept that all those who do not agree with the party are necessarily enemies of the working class. By and large, we have moved a great distance in the direction of non-sectarianism. As a result we have begun to win the admiration and even support of quite a number of revolutionary activists who had previously felt themselves dismissed with name-tags and old-style jargon.

[WORK IN PROGRESS] In view of the SACP's close identification with the ANC's objectives and strategies, what constitutes its claim to be a working-class vanguard at the present stage?

[SACP] We must not confuse the need to mobilise and organise the working class as the dominant social force in the national liberation struggle, and to provide it with political leadership, with the formality of projecting the party itself as the 'leader' of the whole process. Whether it is correct for the party to strive to place itself at the exclusive head of a given revolutionary process depends on specific conditions. In some cases an attempt to do so may retard rather than advance a party's vanguard role. The most advanced class can rarely, if ever, bring about a fundamental transformation on its own. It must always relate to other social forces.

If correct leadership of the democratic revolution requires a strengthening of the national movement as the major organisational force, then this is precisely the way in which a vanguard role is exercised in the real, and not vulgar, sense of the term.

As long as the party does not lose its independence and identity, then support for, and collaboration with, bodies like the ANC as the mass movement heading the struggle, is in no way inconsistent with the true role of a vanguard organisation.

The shared perspectives between the ANC and the party in the present phase do not diminish the independent role of party objectives. The party must help organise the working class and work to ensure that it occupies a dominant place in the alliance of social forces striving for liberation. At the same time it must spread an understanding of socialist ideology and the inseparable link between national democratic and socialist transformation.

[WORK IN PROGRESS] What about the period after the achievement of national liberation? Do you envisage a multi-party system and a parliamentary road to socialism and, if so, what happens then to the role of the party?

[SACP] Our programme holds firmly to a post-apartheid state which will guarantee the basic freedoms and rights of all citizens: the freedoms of speech, thought, press, organisation, movement, conscience and religion; and full trade union rights for all workers, including the right to strike. A multi-party system is therefore clearly implied.

The struggle against capitalism and for an advance to socialism will obviously be taking place in a completely new context. Our programme was not called upon to speculate about struggle options in future hypothetical conditions. But it is clear that in a truly democratic post-apartheid state the way would be open for a peaceful progression towards socialism. Although not always adhered to in practice, Marxism has insisted that the working class must win the majority to its side: as long as no violence is used against the people there is no other road to power.

What you call the 'parliamentary road' can never be separated from extra-parliamentary struggle, but is certainly a possible projection. This would not alter the vanguard role of a working-class party which, as already emphasised, does not imply exclusiveness or inherent rights to a political monopoly. In truly democratic conditions it is perfectly legitimate and desirable for the political instrument of the working class to lead its constituency in democratic contest for political power against other parties and groups representing other social forces.

In such conditions, state power should clearly vest in the elected representatives of the people and not through administrative command of a party. This requires a relationship between party and state structures which does not undermine the sovereignty of elected bodies. Departures from this principle have created serious gaps between the party and the people in many socialist countries in which the party's leading role was imposed rather than won.

[WORK IN PROGRESS] Reports on the 1989 congress indicate a shift in views on armed struggle towards the perspective of national insurrection. Could you explain this?

[SACP] There is a growing understanding, even in the regime's circles, that there is no middle road between a negotiated settlement and a seizure of power. The latter is an act of force usually involving mass upsurge and varying degrees of organised armed activities. History has thrown up a number of categories which illustrate the varied mix between armed struggle and mass insurrection.

In China for example, we saw a protracted people's war which led to the military defeat of the enemy forces.

In Nicaragua the breakthrough took a different course: in the words of Daniel Ortega, 'We thought of the people as a prop that would help us aim military blows at Somoza. Instead the armed struggle became the prop for the people to overthrow the regime through insurrection.'

The Soviet Union provides an example of an insurrection which was not preceded by armed struggle but in which arms played a crucial role at the insurrectionary moment. And in Iran the successful uprising was neither preceded by armed struggle nor did the armed factor play the crucial role. It follows that while an insurrection is always an act of revolutionary force it is not always an armed uprising. Historical experiences are instructive but cannot provide exact models. Our programme insists that we must find our own way guided in the first place by concrete realities and our own experiences. We have concluded that ours cannot be a classical guerilla-type war primarily based on the winning, over time, of more and more liberated territory. Nor can our strategy be based on a perspective of inflicting a conventional military defeat on the enemy. These conclusions help to situate the armed element in the struggle for power more precisely, giving pride of place to the political factor.

But there is certainly no shift away from armed struggle itself. Its escalation is imperative in helping prepare conditions for an insurrectionary breakthrough. Armed struggle is designed to weaken the enemy's grip on the reigns of power, deepen the political and economic crisis, and reinforce political mobilisation, organisation and resistance.

An insurrection, unlike a coup, does not lend itself to blueprints: it can only be placed on the immediate agenda of struggle if and when a specific revolutionary moment has emerged. But this will not happen purely spontaneously: it depends on a convergence of subjective and objective factors.

We believe that the insurrectionary potential is growing within South Africa. This, together with the increasing dimensions of the regime's crisis, suggests the possibility of a relatively sudden national upsurge.

We must therefore be prepared for this. But in general we continue to focus on protracted struggle in which partial and general uprisings propped up by armed support will lead to an insurrectionary breakthrough. In all this, our organised working class is the decisive force.

[WORK IN PROGRESS] How does this notion of the place of insurrection relate to negotiations as an alternative route to the transformation of society?

[SACP] Properly conceived, and at the right moment, negotiations can be regarded as part of the terrain of struggle. There is only one acid test for a revolutionary strategy, and that is whether it will advance revolutionary objectives. The test is not whether it sounds revolutionary. No serious movement can in principle reject all possibilities of negotiations or compromise in the course of struggle.

Our programme sees no conflict between the insurrectionary perspective and the possibility of a negotiated transfer of power. The exact form of the ultimate breakthrough should not be confused with the strategy needed to help create conditions for the winning of power.

The real question is usually not whether to talk to the enemy, but rather when and on what agenda. Some negotiations could be a prelude to surrender, other a recipe for victory. Most of the victorious liberation struggles on our continent had their climaxes at the negotiating table.

But especially at the present, when the air is thick with talk of negotiations, we should remember that they are also a terrain of struggle for the enemy. Its prime motivation is to pre-empt a revolutionary transfer of power by pushing the liberation movement into negotiation before it is strong enough to back its basic demands with sufficient power on the ground.

In determining our positions, we must take other crucial factors into account. Whatever the enemy's intention might be, it is clearly making negotiation noises because of mounting internal and external pressures. It is trying

to find a way out of its present political and economic crisis through achieving governability and legitimacy within its own parameters.

The enemy is also under growing pressure from its allies, which would like to see a transformation going considerably beyond the present reform limits. Within the regime's own ranks and among its white support constituency, there is growing division about the degree of acceptable compromise needed to stave off the internal and external pressures.

All this exacerbates the regime's crisis and adds another element to the terrain of struggle. In this terrain, our liberation movement must not just respond defensively, but rather ensure that we occupy the high ground.

Our party's position is that the basis for negotiations cannot be restricted to the dismantling of apartheid. We do not conflate apartheid with racial domination. Apartheid is clearly the most extreme form of race domination and, as such, helps focus popular revulsion, both inside and outside, against the whole system.

But it is not apartheid which fathered race domination; it is the other way round. We are not struggling to get back to the pre-1948 period. The bottom line of any negotiated solution must be a readiness to accept the principle of majority rule in a united, democratic and non-racial South Africa.

If this is accepted as a starting point there should be room for tossing round questions such as the institutionalised protection of individual rights of culture, language and religion, and the interim mechanisms needed for giving effect to an orderly transition.

It is only through entrenching individual rights that there will be effective safeguarding for the legitimate aspirations of the diverse communities. It is interesting to note that the Olivier Commission makes this same point on a bill of rights.

Whatever prospects exist for a peaceful solution along these lines will depend on the intensification of internal struggle and the stepping-up of external pressures. It would be a mistake by those outside who support our struggle to reduce the regime's political and economic isolation in the hope that this will encourage it to move towards an acceptable negotiation agenda. This course would, in practice, hold back rather than advance prospects for a peaceful solution.

Finally, our programme stresses that whatever prospects may arise for a negotiated transition, they must not be allowed to infect the purpose and content of our strategic approaches. We are not engaged in the struggle with the objective of merely generating sufficient pressure to bring the other side to the negotiating table. While it is necessary to take up offensive positions on the negotiation front, we must guard against any form of demobilisation and against the diversion of our main energies away from the escalation of the struggle.

[WORK IN PROGRESS] What is the party's view on Soviet 'new thinking' concerning the resolution of regional conflicts?

[SACP] Soviet 'new thinking' in the area of international relations is correctly anchored in the reality of the interdependence of the world. This implies, above all, mutual dependence for the sake of survival. This is primarily dictated by consequence of a nuclear holocaust which would respect neither class nor system.

We believe, however, that in many places there is a symbiotic link between the struggle for freedom and the struggle for peace. An attempt always to subordinate the struggle for liberation to the struggle for can subordinate the interests of the developing, unliberated world to those of the developed, liberated world.

It is true that every social and national liberation struggle will upset the equilibrium in the international area, and could be a source of irritation between those who support and those who oppose the transformations sought. But we have doubts that this consideration always requires an abandonment or toning down of conflicts in internal class and liberation struggles.

We do not go along with another, even more disturbing, thesis that there is some overriding human ethic which obliges every movement to renounce revolutionary violence as part of political struggle, even when facing a tyranny which gives it no other way forward.

Nor can it, in our case, be concluded that our continuing struggle by such means poses a risk of world conflagration.

Where a conflict lends itself to a justified negotiated compromise, there is no suggestion of a 'fight to the death'. Such a settlement may be judged correct by the internal forces for a number of reasons, both internal and international. The internal forces may even defuse or postpone an internal conflict if there is a risk of triggering off a global holocaust. But the struggle to assert the right of free choice, the struggle for self-determination and real independence cannot be contained or restricted.

We see no inherent contradiction between the struggle for peace and the struggle for liberation in South Africa. The very existence of the Pretoria regime is a permanent threat to peace and stability. Indeed, our programme states that our main contribution to the overall struggle for world peace is to put an end to race rule by the only means it has until now left open: mass struggle backed by revolutionary violence.

* Efforts To Unite Farmworkers Being Undermined

34000800b Johannesburg THE NEW NATION
in English 11-17 Aug 89 p 16

[Article: "Radical Attack on Fawu"]

[Text] Union-busting has become big business in SA [South Africa] and bosses are increasingly pumping more

and more resources into developing counter strategies to halt the growth of the democratic labour movement.

This has become apparent in the mining, food and printing industries in recent times.

The latest known attack on democratic trade unionism comes in the form of a highly controversial brochure compiled by an industrial relations bureau known as Liaison.

The brochure was circulated among Cape fruit farmers and agricultural organisations in June.

Titled "The Radical Attack on the SA Agriculture Sector", the brochure attempts to link the Food and Allied Workers' Union's (Fawu) organisational activities to the "ANC [African National Congress]'s revolutionary struggle".

"Part of the ANC's revolutionary struggle in South Africa is to organise and unite black farm labourers through trade unions," the brochure says.

Fawu has threatened to take legal action against the compilers of the brochure, which quotes a "senior representative of the enemy" as saying: "What we are afraid of is that the whites will give more and more privileges to the blacks and that the blacks may become satisfied and docile. What we want is (sic) grievances and more grievances so that the black worker will be willing to fight." The brochure, however, does not name the mysterious "enemy official".

It adds that "trade unions get sympathy and loyalty from black labourers by means of:

- informing them of their rights as labourers,
- emotional incitement,
- the extreme exaggeration of current grievances,
- holding out the prospect of high wage demands, and especially
- encouraging new grievances and complaints."

In its attempt to draw further links between the ANC and Fawu, the brochure says the organisation flourishes on the possible lack of knowledge on labour matters among farmers.

The brochure adds that the ANC also thrives on unsatisfactory employment and working conditions.

Fawu has rejected the brochure as irresponsible, misinformed and ill-conceived and says there can be no justification for its publication unless the authors intended to sensationalise the "danger" to farmers and thereby promote sales of the consultants' books and services.

The union warns that the allegations made in the brochure could promote labour unrest and detrimentally affect relations between employers and workers on a wide scale.

Fawu's lawyers say in a letter to Liaison that several prominent farmers and businessmen in the fruit industry were unanimous in the belief that the brochure had tended to "severely diminish the climate of good faith and trust that has been nurtured in the field of rural labour relations".

Fawu, which represents thousands of farmworkers, says it has always striven to create a mature industrial relations climate in the industry.

The union has also come under attack from bosses in the food and beverage sector in recent months.

Hundreds of workers have lost their jobs through retrenchments as a result of rationalisation.

In some cases bosses have handed over the management to agricultural cooperatives in what the union says is an attempt to bring workers under more conservative industrial relations practices.

* Inkatha Establishes Anti-Apartheid Image

34000798b Braamfontein WORK IN PROGRESS
in English Aug/Sep 89 pp 26-30

[Article: "Is Your Enemy's Enemy Automatically Your Friend?"]

[Text] The Natal peace talks highlight the anti-apartheid face of Inkatha and could serve as the organisation's greatest recruitment drive, Gerhard Mare argues. But this emphasis is ironic as Inkatha ambitions to secure a central role in a new national political scheme drive it even more firmly into the arms of the state.

At the outset of the Natal peace talks Inkatha's Gatsha Buthelezi revealed a key source of grievance. 'If you want to talk to Inkatha then stop insulting Inkatha by calling it a central element in the apartheid system,' he said in his memorandum to the United Democratic Front [UDF] and the Congress of South African Trade Unions.

Is Inkatha, in fact, a 'central element in the apartheid system'?

If it is, then why have the UDF and Cosatu entered into 'peace talks' and why is a meeting of four presidents—of Cosatu, the UDF, the African National Congress and Inkatha—apparently on the cards? And why do democratic forces blame the violence in Natal increasingly on the state, as though it is separate from Inkatha? For instance, the Cosatu national congress resolution on the Natal peace initiatives did not once mention Inkatha.

If Inkatha is not part of the apartheid system, then are we to see Inkatha included in the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM), or at least in some broader anti-apartheid front than has existed to date?

Or does Inkatha fall into a separate category?

These are politically strategic questions. They are embraced in decisions such as the Cosatu congress

resolution to set up an anti-apartheid coalition (to replace the banned anti-apartheid conference); the only specifically excluded parties are representatives of capital, and Inkatha is apparently included through mention of the 'peace plan'. The resolution stated: 'The process of building an anti-apartheid coalition has begun in practice through initiatives such as building peace in Natal'.

Inkatha was formed in 1975 to ensure that the kwaZulu bantustan's political leadership did not fall victim to the very system that it was infiltrating with the aim of changing it from within. Inkatha was meant to bridge the gap between notoriously manipulable apartheid structures (or have we forgotten the case of the suits for the Venda chiefs?) and a constituency of members outside of those structures to which it would be accountable.

An important goal was to prevent independence being thrust on the bantustan. As such it was a 'liberation movement' and carried the approval of the ANC [African National Congress]. It set its sights on becoming a nationalist movement, representing the black oppressed throughout South Africa, regardless of class position or ethnic affiliation.

But Inkatha carried the shackles of the system within which it was formed and in which its leadership had participated for many years. It was, after all, formed not to overthrow that system, but to change it through participation. As such, despite its relative success, it remained just another bantustan governing party.

Because it was the sole party in kwaZulu, and because it believed in the correctness of its liberatory strategy, Inkatha's leadership became very sensitive to criticism, especially from those who saw themselves as outside the system and who became organised so rapidly during the 1980s into unions, civic bodies and youth organisations.

From the start there was a tension between what Inkatha believed about itself and what many others believed about it. It saw itself representing the people in their striving towards liberation. But it was also widely seen as a participant in the hated state-created structures of fragmentation and control. Clearly both views were true!

Inkatha placed itself within the tradition of the old ANC, within which Nelson Mandela's centrality is accepted. At its formation the movement carried the approval of what it called the ANC 'Mission in Exile'.

But the fact remained, it governed a bantustan where conditions for the vast majority were no different to those of the people in any other bantustan. The only difference was that kwaZulu was not led into 'independence' by lackeys of the central state.

In fact, the conflict between Buthelezi, his supporters within the kwaZulu Legislative Assembly and Inkatha, on the one hand, and the agents of the central state in the early and mid-1970s reflected the inability of the NP to

see any option other than apartheid 'independence', even for conservative proponents of foreign investment, such as Buthelezi.

Inkatha's leaders have been unable to keep their dual roles separate: on the one hand participating in the kwaZulu government, on the other answering to a broad membership well able to distinguish between the movement's tactical and its essential participation in the apartheid system.

There are many examples of this collapse of functions. Inkatha claims endorsement for its policies from the bantustan electorate. The organisation funds party activity, such as the Buthelezi Commission and the Indaba, through the bantustan's coffers. Inkatha also fails to distinguish between Buthelezi in his various roles of Inkatha president, bantustan chief minister and even minister of police. It uses repressive structures, secured through faithful participation in the bantustan, in its battles with political opponents in the anti-apartheid camp. It also depends on the patronage potential of the bantustan in holding the support of various sections of the petty bourgeoisie.

The importance of the bantustan system to Inkatha, albeit as a temporary base, was evident in a recent newspaper advertisement setting out Inkatha's preconditions for national political negotiations. It omits any mention of dismantling the bantustans although it demands the demise of the tricameral parliament.

The parameters of Inkatha's actions are set by its participation in the structures of apartheid, and also by its self-conscious regional and ethnic political consolidation in the 1980 and the dominant class interests which it serves. It is through an apartheid creation that the trading class can be protected and its access to finance guaranteed.

After Inkatha and the ANC broke their ambiguous relationship in 1979 and after the crushing of the 1980s school boycotts in kwaMashu, the movement decided to consolidate its regional base. It made kwaZulu and Natal as a whole into an ideological and political stronghold.

It pursued this aim in several ways:

- It set up the Buthelezi Commission (BC) which argued that Natal and kwaZulu, administered by the Natal Provincial Administration and the kwaZulu Legislative Assembly [KLA] respectively, were clearly inseparable. The BC report proposed an alternative to apartheid fragmentation—a model based on consociation and federalism. These proposals carried the support of an array of academics, political parties and powerful capitalists.
- Inkatha was centrally involved in the Indaba which, with great publicity, gave further effect to the more academic suggestions of the BC. It is important to realise that, if implemented, the Indaba proposals will set up a regional legislative structure for the first member-state in a South African federation. It builds

on the practical steps that have been taken over the years to create administrative co-operation, such as the establishment of a Joint Executive Authority.

The Indaba was much more than a set of proposals. It promoted alliances between Inkatha and capital as well as with a range of political and cultural bodies—alliances which demand ongoing confirmation. It also put in position certain structures and agents who sell Inkatha's message without being too intimately linked with the organisation. Indaba propaganda is aimed at schools, business, the general public, opinion-makers and foreign governments and pressure groups.

The Indaba has made great strides in gathering support, especially among whites and capitalists. This is not only because of the impact of the state of emergency, but because of the lack of an effective counter-strategy by the MDM. It seems highly unlikely that Inkatha would willingly relinquish the Indaba option simply because it is involved in negotiations with the MDM—which stands for a unitary state and rejects regional solutions.

On the contrary, Inkatha would surely press ahead, establishing as many aspects of regional government as it can. This would give form to its regional base and, since the Natal Indaba will not be an apartheid creation, Inkatha would be able to discard the albatross of being linked to a bantustan.

Through participation in the bantustan, Inkatha has built networks of patronage that will not be shaken loose easily, especially in the absence of alternative services.

It is important to understand that this patronage is not confined to the trading petty bourgeoisie. It extends to civil servants, who depend for their jobs on Inkatha favour, and to the millions who are dependent for survival on the pensions, land and employment schemes made available through Inkatha and the KLA.

Anyone wanting to replace Inkatha in the political allegiances of the recipients of these benefits will have to be able to replace Inkatha's ability to offer means of survival as well. It is exactly at this level that Inkatha's anti-sanctions campaign operates. It argues that it stands for the present and future survival of people, whereas Cosatu and the UDF wish to deprive people of their livelihood while promising a dubious strategy of short-term suffering for liberation.

Inkatha has created structures, no matter how hierarchical and personalised. It has set a pattern of political rejuvenation and direction-giving through conferences and frequent 'prayer meetings'. Inkatha can offer the ritual of repeated rhetorical mass commitment that the MDM has used so effectively.

Inkatha has access to an enviable media network, comprising both its own and sympathetic outlets. This includes Ilanga; SABC [South African Broadcasting Corporation] television and radio; mass meetings; distribution of speeches and reporting of speeches; the kwaZulu

Bureau of Information and its publications such as *Umxoxi* and *Clarion Call*; slick overseas visits and maintenance of offices in foreign capitals.

It has control over the repressive bantustan apparatus of the KwaZulu Police through which it slots into the national security network.

It has access to large amounts of money, both through the KLA (which paid for both the Buthelezi Commission and the Indaba sittings) and sympathetic foreign and local donors. However, Buthelezi believes—probably with some justification—that he would have received much more foreign funding had it not been for the efforts by the MDM and South African Council of Churches (aided overseas by the support given to these bodies by the ANC) to both control funds and deflect them from Inkatha.

Since its conception Inkatha has called on important regional political and cultural symbols, such as the ANC and 'Zulu' ethnicity.

Inkatha argued it was formed to fill a vacuum that existed after the ANC was banned and, even if it did not succeed in doing so in the national political arena, it could fill the role regionally. It has created and recreated an appeal to being Zulu through several means, such as its control over education, which allowed it to introduce the 'Inkatha syllabus'; the central role granted to the King as the symbol of national unity; through stressing Buthelezi's traditionally determined role within the Zulu nation; through celebrating events, such as Shaka Day, with an ethnically specific focus.

Inkatha cannot, and probably will not want to, depoliticise ethnicity in the region. This is, after all, an essential part of ethnic consolidation.

Finally, Inkatha has remained immune from the effects of the state of emergency and will clearly continue to do so.

What are the likely implications of the trends outlined?

The 'scenario' presented below is anything but inevitable. The weaknesses of Inkatha are too numerous to permit confident prediction. But there is a reasonable chance of the following course being pursued.

The release of Nelson Mandela is of central importance to events within the country and within the region. Of course the fate and the actions of a single person cannot decide the future. But what is made of the 'symbol' Mandela will depend on the relative strength of those forces which define their positions and demands in relation to him. For instance, Mandela's release could influence the British government's estimation of those who can be shown to have been reasonable and successful in securing his release.

Buthelezi has always made Mandela's release a precondition for his own participation in negotiations with the central government or in its constitutional schemes. He

has been careful to add that it does not matter what course Mandela chooses after his release; the issue is that he should have that choice. Inkatha's recent newspaper advert qualified its stance on the release of other political prisoners, apart from the Rivonia trialists.

Furthermore, Buthelezi has made it clear that he is not willing to enter national negotiations with other bantustan leaders. He has just turned down another such meeting. It is clear that he will not, and should not, enter the national arena as one of six puppets created through the apartheid policy. His heated reaction to such accusations of manipulation frequently takes the form of claiming his won impeccable revolutionary and traditional credentials. The memorandum he released at the start of the peace talks is a pertinent example.

How, then, does he enter national politics after the release of Mandela?

Before the meeting between P.W. Botha and Mandela, Inkatha's representatives called for the release of Mandela during talks with cabinet ministers on obstacles to negotiation. This demand was relayed to Justice Minister Kobie Coetsee. There can be little doubt that Mandela's release will be laid at the door of the 'negotiation' politics advocated by Inkatha. What is less clear is what Mandela's reaction will be to Inkatha and Buthelezi.

Buthelezi enters the national solution from the stepping stone that he so carefully created—the Indaba. He enters with an agreement from the state that the Indaba proposals, perhaps with some face-saving changes, will form the basis of a new regionally based political dispensation. Talks between Inkatha and the government around the Indaba proposals have formal and on-going status, along with the committee investigating obstacles to Inkatha participating in negotiations.

The Indaba option hangs on two major factors: Buthelezi's control over the regional population, with the support of important constituencies in the business and tricameral worlds; and a clear attitude that 'the gods'—in the form of foreign government aid—will provide to solve the immense problems of regional redistribution. For the latter, massive amounts of money are needed.

This is where the peace plan—or Buthelezi's version of it—comes in. The way the plan is set out in the letter to Catholic Archbishop Denis Hurley makes it potentially the biggest recruitment drive ever undertaken by Inkatha—one which may secure national and even international applause and financial support. More than that, it might make the UDF and Cosatu participants in this Inkatha campaign—conducted under the guise of peace—while these two groups do not have the structures to expose it, counter it, or make use of it as equal partners.

Buthelezi insisting on Ulundi as the venue for a meeting in which he would participate was not simply a fit of pique, but a reprisal for the years during which his

strategy has been scorned and he has been labelled a stooge. Peace to him means more than an end to the killings. It also means an acknowledgment of Inkatha's strategy—and a victory for it.

The new element featured repeatedly in recent speeches by Buthelezi is that, like Shaka, 'we defeat to incorporate'. His advisors are on record over the past years as saying that the only war is that between Inkatha and the ANC.

In conclusion, Inkatha's weaknesses must be considered. Some of these are inherent in its structures and irremediable. Others arise from the situation in which it finds itself. Inkatha remains a regional body, lacking the organisational structures, let alone the legitimacy, to contest national support. This is not a weakness when it comes to negotiating with the state. In fact it is a strength in an arena where the state is trying to reshape South Africa within an updated version of its old fragmentation policy. But in competition with national bodies Inkatha can only find refuge in a particular federal future, or one where 'groups' are given political power.

It would, however, be short-sighted to reject federalism simply because Inkatha supports it. There may well be federal options that deserve to be examined because they do not reinforce the state's ethnic fragmentation while allowing democratic decentralisation. The same holds for proportional representation.

Related to this is Inkatha's dependence on ethnic mobilisation. As with regionalism, of which ethnicity is usually an aspect, Inkatha's strength can also be its weakness. This is primarily because the essence of national politics, as exemplified by the ANC from its formation, is a denial of the struggle against political allocation according to state ethnic categories. While Inkatha remains tied to 'Zuluness'—and it is argued this link cannot be undone—it will suffer the tag of 'tribalism'.

Again, the danger of denying the strength of cultural sentiments simply because they are part of the manipulations of Inkatha must be stressed. A national identity and a national culture cannot be wished into existence. It is one of the most delicate areas of future reconstruction and present practice. The organisations of the working classes, especially, have a central role to play here, despite the fact that ethnic mobilisation has featured in working-class organisations both locally and elsewhere in the world.

At some levels Inkatha is directly an extension of the state, albeit with greater autonomy than, for instance, local government structures. This means it suffers from the same crises as the central state and, like it, Inkatha cannot meet the material demands of residents in such fields as welfare, health and education. It is held responsible for these failures.

In the area of policing, Inkatha is forced to utilise the bantustan force as a branch element of the repressive apparatus of the central state. Here there is much less

autonomy than in less contentious fields such as health. The contemptuous invasion of Bophuthatswana by the SADF [South African Defense Forces] after the short-lived coup by the bantustan military indicates that even 'independence' does not place these armed forces beyond the reach of the central state. In kwaZulu the extension of control is voluntary, with Inkatha's leadership having established a close working relationship with officers in the South African Police.

Inkatha lacks control, or has only partial control, over sections of the regional population. This is especially important where those sections are organised. Examples are: the working class at the place of production; the working class where its organisational strength extends into the community; professionals who are increasingly dissatisfied with the inability of Inkatha, as a regional government, to fulfill its promises of patronage.

The recent strikes and threats of strikes by teachers and civil servants over wages and working conditions serve to illustrate this growing trend. Buthelezi has also been insensitive to the wage demands of kwaZulu state employees, arguing that the sentiments of service, development, and loyalty—to the King, to the nation or the liberation struggle—should outweigh mercenary demands for higher remuneration.

Inkatha has a greater degree of autonomy than any other conservative movement in the country. But its offensive towards national political involvement—tied to the state's own political fumbblings—demands that it co-ordinate with the state, make compromises and show itself to be a worthwhile, albeit reluctant, partner.

The peace talks are serving to remove Inkatha, symbolically, from being part of apartheid structures. This confirms the one aspect of the movement: that it is a very conservative force, but nonetheless against apartheid as a system of racial discrimination. It is ironic that this facet should emerge precisely when Inkatha has become more closely integrated into state structures—especially into security structures—and into capitalism than ever before. It is now part of what could be a future reform state that will outlive the present apartheid policy.

* SADF's Development in Secure Communications

34000808b Johannesburg ARMED FORCES
in English Aug 89 p 23

[Text] During a speech at Voortrekkerhoogte on 14 July when National and Regimental Colours were presented to 2 Signals Regiment, 3 Electronic Workshop, 4 Electronic Workshop and 5 Signals Regiment, the Reviewing Officer, Major General Georg Meiring SSAS, Deputy Chief of the South African Army, covered interesting aspects. During his address, General Meiring dwelt on the significant developments that have taken place within the South African Defence Forces' capability in the field of communications and the various aspects of Electronic Warfare. As his comments on a subject that has been very much of a restricted nature will be of

interest to many of our readers we are publishing an edited version of General Meiring's address.

"As a former Director Signals of the Army, I can proudly associate myself with the four units on parade which have played such an important part in the activities of the South African Army especially since the start of the war in South West Africa about 23 years ago.

2 Signals Regiment has been responsible for the provision of our command and control communications while 3 Electronic Workshop and 4 Electronic Workshop have been maintaining the Army's electronic equipment. An indication of the important role played by the two electronic workshop units can be gained from the fact that they repaired electronic equipment worth about R745 million last year. 5 Signals Regiment, again, is responsible for the Army's electronic warfare and counter-electronic warfare capability.

I am especially pleased to see representatives of Reutech, Grinaker and Intertechnic here today. Not only did they graciously sponsor the Colours presented here, but they have played a vitally important part in making us independent from overseas suppliers in the field of communications equipment.

As you will remember, we were virtually totally dependent on overseas suppliers about twenty years ago. To counter the increasing threat of boycott actions and sanctions, a local electronics industry was established in South Africa in the late sixties. The first locally produced radio was the well-known A39.

This was followed in the 70's by a standardised series of HF and VHF tactical radios of local manufacture. At the same time the tele-communications infrastructure was expanded which made us more independent of foreign sources.

At the moment we are phasing in a new generation of tactical radios which compare with the best in the world. In fact, these products are of such a high standard that they will become a major item on our export markets. I feel that I must compliment the industry on the outstanding research that developed this generation. In addition, despite the problems that have faced the industry, it is interesting to note that our R and D and production time is considerably shorter than that found overseas for the procurement of similar equipment.

The dramatic development that has taken place in the area of communications is best illustrated by a comparison of Operation Savannah in 1975 and Operation Modular and Hooper.

There was dramatic progress in all fields and directions, but I would like to concentrate on the developments in the field of communications.

In 1975 we had to rely mostly on speech communications, but had a limited security ability. Our radios were

manufactured here, but under licence from overseas companies which mean that they were not ideal for our conditions.

We had to rely on civilian equipment, acquired commercially to meet our telex and telegraphic needs. The equipment was not designed for military use and was far from robust. All classified reports had to be encoded off-line before being transmitted. Reports received also had to be decoded off-line with the resultant delays and frustrations.

During Operations Modular and Hooper we had extremely sophisticated equipment which was especially designed for the harsh operational conditions of Southern Africa. We had the ability to communicate in various ways and had extremely efficient electronic security.

In addition to the compact and light, though robust, radio equipment, we had the Data Electronic Terminal (DET) and the Tactical Data Terminal (TDT) with which to send information to and from the battlefield and to and from the different headquarters during and between battles.

We also had the ability to encode and decode on-line which sped up communications incredibly and, without a doubt, contributed greatly to the victories achieved in South Eastern Angola. But, also, as a result of the high standard of technology and reliability, external influences, such as weather conditions, had a very limited influence on communications.

Without fear of contradiction we can thus say that through the judicious application of the lessons learnt during Operation Savannah and subsequent operations as well as the excellent support received from the South African electronic industry, we are today leaders in the field of battlefield communications.

This—coupled to our proven, successful development of armaments and tactical doctrines suited to our conditions—have placed the South African Army in a position envied by other military commanders. In other words we are winners."

*** Assessing Armed Forces' Personnel Needs**

34000808a Johannesburg ARMED FORCES
in English Aug 89 pp 16, 18-21

[Article by Helmoed-Romer Heitman: "A Personnel Structure for the South African Army"; first paragraph ARMED FORCES comment]

[Text] With a general election approaching a number of political parties are advancing their opinions on the subject of defence. It is sometimes difficult to know whether these opinions are based on in-depth military knowledge and strategically accurate information, or simply an election ploy designed to catch votes. In this

article Helmoes-Romer Heitman presents a military opinion on the country's defence needs.

The national service system has once again become the subject of some debate in various circles.

There are several factors which have contributed to this renewed interest. Perhaps the most important among these, are the end of the counter-insurgency campaign in South-West Africa [SWA], and local spin-offs of the current Soviet 'peace offensive' against Europe and the United States. Quite a few people have, naively, chosen to read into these developments a 'peace in our time' situation, which would allow major reductions in the funds and the manpower allocated to defence. Given the unpopularity of national service and the very strong politically-motivated attacks on the system, it is hardly surprising that it has drawn much of the comment.

[Boxed item] It is a doctrine of war not to assume the enemy will not come, but rather to rely on one's readiness to meet him....—Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*[end boxed item]

The readers of this journal do not need to be warned against the dangers of reading too much into these developments. It should suffice to merely remind them that the SWA campaign was not very manpower-intensive as far as the SADF [South African Defense Force] itself was concerned, much of the manpower having been locally recruited.

No serious situation or threat analysis will, therefore, support any reduction in the strength of the armed forces in the near- or medium-term future.

That having been said, the current national service system does leave much to be desired. Not only is it far from ideal for the armed forces, it does also result in collateral economic damage. It draws out of the economy for two years at a stretch, the very people who are critical to the growth and future development of the economy—the young men of the 'first world' sector of the economy. It delays their professional/vocational training and their entry into the economy. It then later potentially disrupts their life and career over another ten years or more as a result of call-ups for training periods or service. On the individual level, it places these men at a quite considerable disadvantage vis a vis women and men not liable for national service.

Given the critical need to create job opportunities and generate economic growth generally, these are complications and frictions which South Africa could well do without.

Serious consideration must therefore be given to an alternative system which can meet the needs of defence without complicating the economic development of the country more than can be helped. Some trade-offs between the needs of defence and of the economy will

have to be accepted. The key consideration here must be the simple fact that neither serves any purpose without the other.

Manpower Provisioning

There are several possible options. The most popular among those currently voicing an opinion, appears to be a fully professional defence force.

This is unlikely to be a practicable option in South Africa for some time to come:

- It would be too expensive in money terms. Not only would the actual salary account be vastly higher than that of a national service/citizen force system, but the additional costs attached to such a force of regulars in the form of housing and medical benefits, insurance, etc., would be considerable. A calculation based on relevant figures for some other armies suggests that the personnel costs of a fully regular army alone—not counting the other services at all—would fall not far short of South Africa's entire current defence budget: There would be no funds for equipment, stores, research and development, training or anything else, unless the defence budget was vastly increased.
- It would be too expensive in manpower terms. Modern armed forces cannot employ just anyone. They seek and need those very men who are already in critically short supply in South Africa—young men with technical aptitudes or skills, and those at ease exercising leadership. Were this not so, the national service/citizen force system would not present an economic problem. While the current system draws many of these critically needed people out of the economy for two years early in their lives and for short, albeit disruptive, periods later, a fully regular force would draw a very large number of them out of the economy permanently.

[Boxed item] 'They have carried the torch of democracy for our country, putting their lives on the line for the preservation and protection of our nation, under the flag.' Rep. Ike Skelton[end boxed item]

It could result in sociopolitical problems greater and more dangerous than those which accompany the present system. Should, for instance, the regular force draw chiefly young black men, it would draw out of the economy precisely those among them who are most able to make the transition to the 'first world' sector of the economy. This would create a potentially very dangerous gulf between the two main economic groupings, and one which would be extremely difficult to bridge. Unfortunately, it is these young black men who would be most attracted by a military career.

Fully regular armed forces are, therefore, unlikely to become a practicable option for the foreseeable future.

What would be practicable, is a composite force comprising full career, short- and medium-service, and national-service soldiers in a standing force backed by a strong reserve.

A suitably constructed manpower provisioning system, making the optimum use of these different service categories, would go some way towards addressing the problem. Specifically, it would allow the initial national service period to be reduced, perhaps to as little as twelve months, without depriving the armed forces of the training manpower and the reserves which they need.

The remainder of the article will discuss one possible system of this nature. As the Army is the primary employer of manpower, it will concentrate on the needs of this service. A similar system could readily be devised to meet the manpower needs of the other services.

The Army—Missions and Needs

In order to discuss Army manpower provisioning intelligently, it is necessary to first consider the basic missions falling to the Army, and the basic structure which these will require.

The South African Army must be able to perform operations in the execution of four key missions:

- Deter conventional attack by one or more neighbouring states and/or a force inserted from outside the region.
- Defeat conventional attack in the event of deterrence having failed.
- Deter neighbouring states from allowing terrorist groups to operate from their territory.
- Conduct border protection and counter-insurgency operations in support of the Police.

Conventional Deterrence

It is patently clear that South Africa cannot deter any major power from employing conventional force to achieve a particular development in South Africa and in the region. The force levels and expenditure required are simply not practicable.

South Africa can, however, develop and field conventional forces sufficiently powerful to render such an adventure potentially so costly as to make it unattractive under most circumstances. In a sense, one might speak of discussion rather than deterrence.

This conventional force would then also suffice to deter attack by any neighbouring state.

The Requirements

Without going into a detailed analysis, a force level of around ten manoeuvre brigades plus the necessary supporting elements, will need to be developed. This would, depending on the detailed organisation of the formations and units, require in the region of 100,000 men.

Fortunately, it would not be necessary to have this force fully mobilised at all times. Even the speediest imaginable build-up of a conventional force in the region, would leave ample time to mobilise reserve units and formations. A portion of this force would, however, have

to be 'standing' or full-time, to cover the mobilisation of the main force, and to deter surprise attack by a force which would otherwise be too small to seriously threaten South Africa.

The conventional deterrence mission will, therefore, require two distinct elements:

- A small standing conventional force able to react effectively to any practicable surprise attack, if only to cover the full mobilisation of the conventional force.
- A conventional reserve sufficiently powerful to deal with any conventional attack by a neighbouring state, or by an expeditionary force of practicable size.

It would probably also pay to form a distinct intervention force of specialised troops to handle situations unsuited to the style of mechanised forces. The intervention force would be an element of the standing force, but with rather different manning needs.

Conventional Operations

The conduct of conventional operations in the event of dissuasion/deterrence having failed, will require the same force level and structure as required by the deterrence mission. This article does not require a detailed discussion of the doctrines and organisations involved, as these do not impinge on the topic under discussion beyond what has been addressed above.

Low-intensity Deterrence

One key lesson of the counter-insurgency campaign in South-West Africa has been that pre-emptive strikes on insurgent bases in host countries are an extremely efficient response to insurgency and terrorism. This has also been quite clearly demonstrated by the Turkish, Iraqi and Iranian campaigns against dissident Kurds during the 1980s. The cost of not doing so, has been equally well illustrated in other campaigns of the post-WW II era.

A counter-insurgency strategy which incorporates such operations will:

- Allow the campaign to be conducted with very much lower force levels than would otherwise be required.
- Keep civilian casualties to terrorism to a minimum, by virtue of keeping most terrorists away from the target populace most of the time.

Clearly enunciated, such a strategy will also make neighbouring states less likely to grant base facilities in the first place. In this respect, such a policy is one of modified deterrence—designed to deter the use of insurgency as a form of low-profile warfare. The intending sponsor or host is faced with the danger of the hoped-for insurgency in the target country being exported into his own territory in the form of raids on insurgent bases.

This mission of low-intensity deterrence will require a standing mechanised and airborne force sufficiently powerful to carry out raids on insurgent bases close to South Africa's borders.

This force can be relatively small, perhaps of brigade strength. It can thus readily be the same standing force as is required by the conventional deterrence and mobilisation-covering missions. No additional force will be needed.

Counter-insurgency Operations

The counter-insurgency mission is a very manpower-intensive one, even where a strategy of pre-emptive strikes is applied.

It is to perform this mission effectively, the Army will need to develop and maintain a large reserve force of infantry units. There can be no possibility of meeting the needs of this mission with a standing force, the manpower requirement is simply too great.

The key elements needed for this mission, will be regional light infantry battalions, static protective units, and a mobile force of light infantry supported by some heavy weapons. This latter force will be needed for employment as a 'schwerpunkt force', to seize the initiative in a particular area before again handing over to the local forces, and to relieve local forces which have been operating for extended periods.

Summing Up

Having outlined the basic missions and their force requirements, the following section will discuss a possible manpower structure optimised to meet the requirements with a minimum of economic or social damage.

A Possible Army Organisation

Considering the outlined missions and the manpower requirements, we can arrive at an overall army organisation comprising:

- A Manoeuvre Force to address the requirements of conventional and low-intensity deterrence and conventional operations.
- A Territorial Force to address the requirements of counter-insurgency operations.

This is essentially the same structure [as] the present one. The key changes will lie in the division of each force into elements with differing manpower provisioning requirements.

[Boxed item] 'In times of peace, there are those who don't want to think about war, much less spend money preparing for it. But as George Washington so wisely counseled our countrymen. 'To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual ways of preserving peace.'— Sen. Phil Gramm, US Senate[end boxed item]

The Manoeuvre Force

As has already been discussed above, the manoeuvre force can be organised into two or three components: A

small standing force and a larger reserve force and, possibly, an intervention force. These could, for example, comprise:

Intervention Force

- 1 airborne brigade (strike force)
- Special forces elements

Standing Force

- 1 mechanised brigade (strike force/covering force)
- 1 mechanised brigade under training (support/first reserve)

Operational Reserve

The armoured, mechanised and motorised brigades required to carry out conventional defence operations in terms of the basic conventional strategy and doctrine. One possible force structure might include:

- 2 armoured brigades (the destruction force)
- 4 mechanised brigades (the manoeuvre/pursuit force)
- 1 light mechanised brigade (rapid deployment force)

THE TERRITORIAL FORCE

Mobile Force

The mobile force would consist of a number of motorised infantry brigades with limited heavy equipment. Their role would be to support local forces faced with a major problem, and to relieve local forces which have been deployed to an extended time. They would initially be formed in those territorial commands which are the most likely to face serious insurgency/border security/internal security problems. Others could later be formed in other commands, drawing on manpower not required for the local security role.

Suitably equipped with a basic armoured personnel carrier—such as the Casspir—and some armoured cars (Elands) and artillery (25 pdr/87 mm guns or 120 mm mortars), these brigades would also be available for employment with the conventional force. In this role they would make up for the lack of infantry in modern mechanised and armoured forces. These motorised brigades of the Territorial Force would, thus, be a true mobile 'switch force', available for deployment as and where needed.

Area Force

The area forces would comprise static local security units and a number of light infantry battalions with limited motorisation. Their primary roles would be local security operations, key point defence and operations in support of the Police. This is, essentially, the role of the Commando Force as it was before the regrouping of recent years.

Manning the Army

Each of the component elements of the Manoeuvre and Territorial Forces will have different manning requirements. These can be tailored to allow full and effective manning of the Army without causing serious economic disruption or personal difficulty other than under exceptional circumstances.

The key factor in this proposal lies in the efficient use of the three major full-time categories—regulars, medium-service and short-service. The proper use of personnel in these categories to fill those posts most requiring high levels of training and technical competence, or a high degree of readiness, will allow the basic period of national service to be shortened, perhaps to twelve months. These longer-serving members would then also fill the bulk of similar posts in the reserve forces, once they have completed their active service. The relatively short-serving former national service personnel would be posted to less demanding posts for their reserve service.

The Manoeuvre Force

Intervention Force

The Intervention Force would be manned by a mix of regulars and short-service volunteers. It would also have a reserve element drawn from former members who wish to remain on its reserve, and who would, therefore, be available for the necessary refresher training and for short-notice call-up when needed operationally. Former members not wishing or not able to remain on this reserve would be allocated elsewhere, depending on their circumstances.

Standing Force

The Standing Force would be manned as follows:

Senior Officers and NCOs—Regulars

Middle-Rank Officers and NCOs—Regulars, Medium-Service, Reservists on Active Duty

Junior Officers and NCOs—Regulars, Medium-Service, Short-Service, Reservists on Active Duty

Specialists—Regulars, Medium-Service, Short-Service

Others—Short-Service, National-Service.

It would have the lowest possible proportion of national-service personnel, essentially using NSM [National Security Management] only to fill posts which cannot be filled by other categories. This would avoid the problems of personnel turbulence and inadequate training for mechanised operations, which would attend NSM serving for only one year.

Operational Reserve

The brigades of the Operational Reserve would be manned chiefly by officers, NCOs and men who have served in the standing force or the intervention force but

have now left active service. Some senior and technical posts would be filled with full-time men, and NSM could be posted to fill some general-duties posts where needed. Part-time posts which cannot be filled with former members of the standing or intervention forces, would be filled with reservists who served in one of the infantry brigades of the Territorial Force during their initial national service.

[Boxed item] 'Years of complacency and isolation before World War II led to the battle that had raged where I stood. The men who died at the start of the war had, in effect, been sentenced to die by those who had ignored the gathering storm.'—Sen. Phil Gramm, US Senate [end boxed item]

The Territorial Force

Mobile Force

The Infantry Brigades of the Territorial Force would have much the same personnel mix as the brigades of the Operational Reserve. The chief difference would be that each would have at least one standing battalion manned by NSM, and with its leadership and specialist posts filled by full-time personnel. The brigade headquarters would also have a larger proportion of full-time personnel, to meet the demands of ongoing planning and rapid reaction to a sudden deterioration in either the internal security or the border security situation.

This force would be the main user of national service personnel. The relatively lower technology level of its equipment, and the less complex of its tactical employment, would allow the period of service to be rather lower than would be required for the conventional force elements. It should be possible to meet the demands of this force with an initial service period of some twelve months. The detailed timing of this initial service could be adapted to suit the end of the school year and the beginning of the academic year at universities, technicals and technical colleges.

Area Force

The Area Force would comprise territorially-bound light infantry units for general internal security tasks, and protection units specially 'tailored' for their tasks of protecting key points of various types. These units would be manned by reservists drawn from among men who have rendered their initial national-service. Units 'tailored' to the protection of specific installations or areas would draw as many of their personnel as possible from the installation of area being protected.

Personnel Categories

The following paragraphs outline the envisaged personnel groups, and how they would fit into the force structure discussed above.

FULL-TIME PERSONNEL

Permanent Force (Regulars)

The Permanent Force would comprise officers and NCOs accepted for a full career in the SADF. Such personnel would generally serve from joining to retirement age, whereafter they would draw a pension. Earlier separation would make them available for service as reservists. Depending on the length of service prior to premature separation—and the reason therefor—a gratuity might be payable in lieu of a pension, or the member could be allowed to choose either or these, or a partial payout followed by a reduced pension on reaching pensionable age.

Medium Service

Medium-Service contracts would be available in all categories of officer and NCO posts and for some specialists. The period of service could be ten years, extendable by five-year increments. As in other countries, medium-service personnel would be entitled to 're-training' for a civilian occupation after completion of their service, and to a cash gratuity. The extent of the re-training entitlement and the value of the gratuity, would vary with the length of service. On leaving the full-time force, medium-service personnel would become liable for service as reservists.

Short-Service

Short-Service would be intended primarily for junior officer and NCO posts, and to fill other ranks in the intervention and standing forces. The minimum period would be one year for other ranks and two years for NCOs and officers, to be served over and above the national service commitment. Short-service personnel would receive a cash gratuity on completion of their service, the value varying with the length of service. On discharge from the full-time force, they would become liable for service as reservists.

Reservists on Active Duty

Reserve personnel would be entitled to request a tour of active duty at any time during their service in the reserve. Acceptance for active duty would depend on the availability of a post which is both suited to the member's qualifications and rank and which is suited to filling for the period which the member has asked to serve on active duty. Such service would be treated as short- or medium-service, depending on the period involved.

National-Service Personnel

National-service personnel would serve a laid-down period in the post and rank suited to their particular qualifications and actual employment in the service. Wherever possible they would be employed in their area

of competence, insofar as they have obtained some post-school qualification or experience which is relevant to the armed forces.

Most national-service personnel would, however, be drafted after completing their schooling and would serve as privates after the completion of basic, advanced individual and mustering training. Given that leadership and technical posts and most soldier posts in the manoeuvre force would be filled by full-time personnel of one or another category, the basic period of service could be of one year's duration. This would allow three months each for the three training phases, followed by three months service in the particular role to 'settle' what has been learned, before being transferred to a suitable reserve post. This relatively short period of training would, however, require that these personnel are rigorously constrained to attend refresher/updates training 'camps' over the two to three years following the basic national service period. Only thereafter would it be possible to be more flexible in granting deferments.

Most national service personnel would serve with the motorised brigades of the Territorial Force. Those posted to the standing force, would be employed in 'low tech' post, the needs of which can be satisfied with personnel serving for only twelve months.

Civilian Personnel

The armed forces should also seek to make far more extensive use of civilian employees to fill suitable posts within the armed forces. Employing combat-training officers and NCOs in administrative posts is often very wasteful of their training and experience. Employing national service personnel in such posts is also inefficient in the extreme. Not only do they lack experience and continuity in these tasks, they are often not very interested in their work—with results which we have all experienced. This approach also results in a vast reserve pool of soldiers trained primarily for administrative tasks, and lacking training and experience in other roles. There will be little call for these men in wartime, because the posts for which they are qualified, are posts that are always filled—by other national servicemen—and thus do not have any real mobilisation component. Employing civilians wherever the duties of the post do not demand military training and where the officer or NCO does not need experience of those duties, would result in a far more efficient system.

Part-Time Personnel

Part-time personnel would be reservists who have completed their basic national service and/or one of the other forms of service. They would be liable for refresher/updates training at regular intervals and for mobilisation in the event of emergency or war.

Personnel who rendered their initial service in the standing or intervention force, would generally be assigned to the brigades of the Operational Reserve. Exceptions would be those who wish to be on the reserve

of the intervention force, and those whose occupational or personnel situations would make service with the brigades of the Operational Reserve an undue hardship. The latter would be posted to the area force.

Personnel who rendered their initial service in the motorised brigades of the Territorial Force, would generally be assigned to the reserve battalions of these brigades, and to units of the area force.

Personnel who rendered their initial service in headquarters or specialist roles, would be assigned as needed, subject to their personal situation when possible.

General Reserve

Personnel not required for further part-time service, or unable to render such service for occupational or personal reasons, would be held in a general reserve. They could be transferred from this reserve to a suitable part-time post when needed. They would also remain available to the Army as an individual personnel reserve, to use as replacements for casualties in time of war. Each unit would retain a proportion of former members as a 'first reserve' for its own use, in the interests of maintaining unit cohesion. Only the personnel surplus to this requirement, would be transferred to the general reserve *per se*.

Conclusion

This article has discussed one possible approach to meeting the manpower needs of the SADF without causing excessive economic or personal difficulties.

A system such as that discussed above will, however, be entirely dependent on there being sufficient men willing to join the armed forces in the various longer-service full-time categories. Until this situation can be achieved, the armed forces will continue to rely on national service to also provide the manpower needed for training- and technology-intensive posts, and to maintain the necessary standing force levels. This will preclude any reduction in the initial national service period much below eighteen months—unless a defence force of reduced capability is acceptable.

Detailed consideration will, therefore, have to be given to implementing various full-time service categories, and to making them sufficiently attractive. This will, inevitably, not be at all cheap. Done properly, however, it could bring South Africa to a situation where the main economic disadvantages of national service can be reduced to a minimum without weakening defence.

Angola

UNITA Official Says Cease-fire Ready for Signing

LD1909095989 Lisbon International Service
in Portuguese 0600 GMT 19 Sep 89

[Text] Jardo Muekalia, UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] spokesman in Washington, said in the U.S. capital that his movement and the Angolan Government have negotiated a cease-fire, which is ready to be signed.

The agreement has been reviewed by all sides over recent days, Muekalia said. He added: It is acceptable to UNITA in its present form, and we have been informed by the mediator that the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] has accepted it too. However, the UNITA representative declined to give details on the terms of the alleged cease-fire.

Jardo Muekalia added that the UNITA delegation led by Jorge Valentim, which is in Zaire, has a mandate to sign a formal cease-fire with the Angolan Government.

Asked why Jonas Savimbi had not gone to Kinshasa to sign the document, the UNITA spokesman said this was not necessary since the delegation has a mandate to sign this agreement.

Dos Santos Returns From Kinshasa Summit

MB1909062589 Luanda Domestic Service in Portuguese
0600 GMT 19 Sep 89

[Text] Comrade Jose Eduardo dos Santos, MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola]-Labor Party chairman and president of the People's Republic of Angola, last night returned from Kinshasa, Republic of Zaire, where he had been since yesterday morning to attend a summit of southern and central African heads of state.

The summit, held at the Zairian head of state's presidential [words indistinct] drafted a declaration on the ongoing Angolan peace process, the text of which the mediator should submit to UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] leader Jonas Savimbi for signing.

Mauritius

* Offshore Banking Approved for Rothschild

34190345a Port Louis LE MAURICIEN
in French 19 Aug 89 p 1

[Article by Leon Baya: "Offshore Banking: the Rothschild Group Receives Letter of Agreement From the Bank of Mauritius; 'I Have Taken Note of Your Seriousness and Your Country's Remarkable Development,' said the group's head"]

[Text] Yesterday Rothschild, the very powerful Franco-Swiss financial group, received from the Bank of Mauritius the letter agreeing to its request for an operating

permit for offshore banking. The letter was presented by Indur Ramphul, the governor of the Central Bank, to Baron Edmond de Rothschild, the head of the group, who was accompanied by his son and his right-hand man, Jean-Pierre Rosfelder.

Asked about his group's decision to set up an "offshore banking unit" on Mauritius, Baron Rothschild stated that its choice had been motivated by two factors: (a) the seriousness of the Mauritian Government and banking authorities; and (b) the upward trend in the country's balance of payments and the "remarkable development" of the tertiary sector and the free zone.

"I believe Mauritius can play a major role in the area of 'offshore [banking],' just like Bermuda," said the baron, who said he was confident he could find qualified staff, financial advisers, and lawyers for his offshore banking unit on Mauritius. "We'll very firmly maintain our family's tradition as well as French and Swiss tradition. We think we'll be able to expand the group's activities on Mauritius," he added.

Providing further details, Baron Rothschild suggested that the group will study the prospect of opening a distillery to manufacture [sugar] cane liquor. On the subject of tourism, he noted that, as a Club Mediterranean administrator, he will supervise the development of the club at Pointe-aux-Canonniers which, he stressed, has thus far been satisfactory. Earlier, in a conversation with the governor of the Bank of Mauritius, the baron suggested that Mauritius should avoid mass tourism at any price. To which Mr Ramphul replied that the government's stated policy is one of selective tourism.

At the same time, the governor of the Bank of Mauritius announced that Mauritius will make a "package" offer to businesses that would like to start up "offshore" activities in areas other than banking and that he thought these activities could get off the ground next year. "We hope to do our part," Baron Rothschild confided.

Furthermore, the offshore banking unit of Barclay's Bank, the first institution to obtain an "offshore" permit, will open officially on the 25th of this month. The Barclay's unit will have its offices at Chancery House.

* Economies of Neighboring Islands Discussed

34190345d Port Louis LE MAURICIEN
in French 17 Aug 89 p 5

[Excerpt of remarks made by P. Mohith, permanent secretary at the Ministry of Industry, at the Rouen fair: "The Economic and Industrial Structure of Our Neighbors"; first paragraph is LE MAURICIEN introduction]

[Text] Continuing our coverage of news from the workshop on economics held at the Rouen fair, we reprint below an excerpt of the remarks made by Mr P. Mohith, the permanent secretary at the Ministry of Industry, on the subject of the economic and industrial structure of Mauritius' four neighboring islands: the Comoros, Madagascar,

Reunion, and the Seychelles. We believe this excerpt will be of interest to Mauritian businessmen who wish to develop relations with their Indian Ocean counterparts.

The Comoros

The Comoros, which have a population of 408,000, are currently in a rather unfavorable environment. They are experiencing a weak level of activity, a high rate of unemployment, and a balance of payments deficit. The main agricultural products for 1988, i.e., vanilla beans, cloves, and copra, have been declining when compared to 1987.

As far as industry is concerned, it is practically nonexistent and small scale, being limited to a few activities such as textile manufacture, soap production, unfinished wooden furniture, foam rubber mattresses, and some other fledgling activities.

Despite current problems, there is a firm resolve on the part of the Comoros Government to get the economy rolling. Setting up new businesses with an export orientation would be a meaningful solution to bring down both unemployment and the balance-of-payments deficit. As part of this effort, the Comoros Government is encouraging the setting up of small- and medium-sized businesses and promoting the growth of tourism.

Nevertheless, the infrastructure of the archipelago is not adequate to support the rapid creation of industrial businesses. Here we see a handicap that might be overcome in the medium and long terms. However, it is necessary to think about overall planning for development, to be centered around the identification and setting up of new industries and associated services and around the training of the labor force and managers. The strategy adopted by the Comoros Government, and I congratulate it for this, points in this direction.

Madagascar

Madagascar, the largest island in the region, has close to 11 million inhabitants. The primary sector has a preponderant role in the Malagasy economy. Indeed, 85 percent of the population lives in the countryside and earns a living from agriculture and raising animals. Madagascar's main exports are agricultural products or products derived from agriculture such as green coffee, vanilla, sugar, and clove extract. The other major source of export revenue comes from mining, notably chrome.

The current per capita gross national product is still a poor one. It is \$240 per annum. Between 1987 and 1988, the growth rate of the net domestic product was 1.8. The forecast figures for the economy in 1989 are for a strong improvement in the economic picture. These figures do indeed take into account the new direction taken by Madagascar. The growth rate of the net domestic product is thus forecast to be 4.5, and the growth rates for imports and exports are forecast to be 13.1 and 15.7 percent, respectively.

While it isolated itself for many years, for the past year or so, Madagascar has opted for a market economy. This willingness by the Malagasy government has taken the form of privatizing three state banks. In the area of agriculture as well, the government has allowed the private sector a free rein. It was in this way that the marketing of pepper and cloves passed into the hands of the private sector. In terms of industry, privatization is under way as well and it is being accompanied by a genuine effort to promote new private investments, notably in joint ventures with foreign industrial leaders. However, as the government wishes to avoid chaotic liberalization, and in this it is perfectly correct, some major production and marketing avenues remain under its control. This is particularly the case of coffee and vanilla, which account for 70 percent of the government's export revenues.

It is the aim of the Malagasy government, with the support of the international community, to get the country's economy going again. Western creditors have shown themselves to be highly responsive to the efforts put forth by both the Malagasy authorities and the island's industrial leaders. Personally, I believe that Madagascar's abundant agricultural, mining, and human resources will quickly allow the country to begin its economic start-up and contribute fully to the development of the region.

Reunion

As for Reunion, which is the French overseas department in the Indian Ocean, it has a population of close to 600,000.

During the 60's, the primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors employed 44, 21, and 35 percent of the population, respectively. Now, in the 80's, this breakdown has developed with a gain for the tertiary sector. Thus, the primary sector employs no more than 15 percent of the active population, the secondary sector 16 percent, and the tertiary sector 69 percent, 35 percent of this being in the public sector.

As for the trend in this gross domestic product, in the past 15 years it has experienced a period of rather healthy growth. However, the growth experienced a sudden halt in 1983. Only beginning in 1985 did economic growth start up again, due mainly to renewed construction activity tied to an increase in consumption and investments.

In relation to the other islands in the region and industrial development, Reunion's handicap remains the high cost of manpower. So it is not feasible to set up a free industrial zone on Reunion as was done on Mauritius. The prices of its products would not be competitive.

Another major handicap for the development of Reunionese industry lies with Reunion's special status. As an integral part of France, it is subject to the free entrance of European products and products from the ACP (Africa-Caribbean-Pacific) countries. So it is open to the dual

competition of EEC countries, which can produce major yields by dint of their big domestic markets, and of ACP countries, whose labor costs are relatively low. The policy of substitutions in imports thus has not borne the expected fruit and has been limited to activities whose import freight costs are prohibitive.

The limits of this industrial development may be the reasons that explain the major role taken by the tertiary sector in the Reunionese economy. This development of services should continue to grow larger, thanks mainly to the setting up of new infrastructures that should promote the sector of services such as tourism, transportation, and telecommunications. Furthermore, the role played by these sectors in the Reunionese value added is growing.

The Seychelles

Let us now look at the Seychelles. The Seychelles archipelago, including about 100 large and small islands, has a population in the neighborhood of 66,000. Unlike the other islands in the region, the Seychelles economy is not based on agriculture. In fact, this country's agriculture is not very developed and its industry is almost nonexistent. The Seychelles economy depends basically on two sources of wealth provided by its environment. I am speaking of the sea and tourism.

The Seychelles' economic development has made it possible for it to have one of the highest per capita gross domestic products in the region, thus making it one of the richest countries in the Indian Ocean.

1986 was a year marked by economic hardships that resulted in a hard currency shortage. However, 1988 was the year that saw the economic picture brighten, and hard currency reserves grew by 30 percent due to tourism and fish exports, primarily tuna.

Revenue from tourism increased by 16 percent and accounts for 48 percent of the gross national product, while exports of goods rose by 250 percent. This big rise is due mainly to a new industrial unit that produces canned tuna.

Nevertheless, servicing the debt eats up most of these surpluses. But the positive signs, such as the steadiness of the Seychelles rupee, the rising tourist rate, and the development of the tuna industry, are all indicators of an economy which wants to develop in a healthy fashion. Viewed in this light, the 1986 restrictions have been gradually lifted and flexibility has reappeared in the loan climate for the private sector, thus encouraging the latter to invest.

More than the other member countries of the Indian Ocean Community, the Seychelles are especially affected by the small size of its population. With such a limited market made up of 66,000 inhabitants, very few manufacturing activities can be viable and seem to center on the two economic motors of tourism and fishing: handicrafts, costume jewelry for tourists, smoked fish, etc.

* Duval Support, MMM Losing Followers

34000797a London AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL
in English 28 Jul 89 pp 6-7

[Text] The imprisonment of Sir Charles Gaetan Duval at the end of June has resulted in unexpected support for the veteran rightwinger's Parti mauricien social-démocrate (PMSD) from the island's Christian population.

This support, and the tenor of Duval's speeches since he was released on bail on 27 June, is causing great anxiety among Hindus. They have rallied en bloc to Prime Minister Anerood Jugnauth. The Mouvement militant mauricien (MMM) is now in an embarrassing situation as it could be the major loser from recent events. And the fragile understanding between different ethnic communities seems to be going off the rails once again.

Duval's imprisonment resulted from the police re-opening a 1971 case: the assassination of MMM activist Azor Adelaide by a gang of political agents close to the PMSD. Paul Sarah was convicted of killing Adelaide while the other three—Ignace Balloo, Morghesh Shummoogum and Jacques David—were convicted of being accomplices. Both Sarah and Shummoogum were sentenced to 20 years but have since been released. They have sworn affidavits and made fresh statements to the police accusing Duval of complicity and of having ordered them to murder the MMM secretary-general, Paul Berenger, the real target of the 1971 attack. The police has now issued a formal charge against Duval of 'giving instructions to commit murder.' If he were found guilty, he could face a 20-year sentence or even the death penalty.

Duval, once known as 'King Creole' on account of his popularity among Mauritians of African descent, had lost the support of Christians to the MMM following the PMSD's 1969 coalition with the Labour-Independent Forward Bloc and the Comité d'action musulmane (LP-IFB-CAM) government. But his detention caused a sudden wave of sympathy among Creoles that has taken Mauritius by surprise. Support came from the Catholic Church, mainly via civil rights activist Father Henry Souchon, and from two Christian-owned independent dailies, L'EXPRESS and LE MAURICIEN, as well as the weekly WEEKEND. Traders also leapt to his defence.

Duval's release on bail is also the result of the chaotic situation which threatened after an outbreak of violence in Curepipe on 26 June. PMSD supporters smashed government and private cars and buildings in an anti-Hindu spree. There were threats to organise violent demonstrations in towns and villages around the country, with talk of burning Hindu-owned sugar-cane fields.

Since his release Duval has drawn mass audiences to his public meetings, with crowds 90 per cent Creole, much to the MMM's astonishment. Buoyed by this reception, he has started talking of the 'Return of King Creole'. Coupled with his populist style, this image won him 44 percent of the votes in the 1967 general elections, which acted as a referendum on independence for Mauritius.

His current use of pro-Creole and anti-Hindu slogans has attracted widespread criticism, including from the government, the MMM and other groups which fear a resurgence of ethnic clashes. Duval has been openly encouraging the Christians' and Muslims' historic grudge against the Hindus. He has also called on the public to come en masse to the court to support him when his trial begins.

He has also warned that his objective 'is to push Jugnauth out of power' and that, to this end, he will 'strangle economic development'. He has a lot of friends in Europe and could do a great deal of harm. He has threatened on television to ask friends abroad to campaign against tourists coming to the island. His PMSD supported the 4 July strike organised by the National Trade Union Council (NTUC) over civil service claims for salary increases to compensate for last year's 15 percent inflation rate. The official figure for inflation this year, announced on 21 July, is 16.1 percent. The government had refused compensation and frozen salary increases for two years. The NTUC was embarrassed by Duval's support for the strike as a divided union movement has long been trying to find a much-needed platform for unity beyond its political differences.

The country is at a difficult pass, with the economy shifting from being labour-intensive to capital-intensive. Labour shortages and high rates of pay have caused the closure of over 30 industries in the export processing zone (EPZ) and the growth rate of the gross national product (GNP) has fallen from seven to five percent. The government is busy managing the recent successful economic recovery and is confident that Duval is out of step with modern times in his effort to revive the attitudes and objectives which were his strength in the 1960s and 1970s.

However, support for Duval has much to do with opposition to Jugnauth and his government. Many feel strongly about the prime minister's policies, including recent amendments to the Official Secrets Act and the People's Representation Act that greatly reinforce state authority. Since his resignation in 1987, Duval has been looking for a showdown with the prime minister. Hence his proposals this month for a national unity government of the MMM, the Labour Party and the PMSD. But both Labour and the MMM rejected this idea. Indeed, the Duval affair has been instrumental in suddenly civilising relations between the premier and Berenger, while Caseem Uteem, the deputy leader of the MMM, is openly calling for the reunification of the MMM and the Mouvement socialiste mauricien (MSM). The MMM remains prudent, since it is losing support from a fair number of Creoles and Muslims who supported the MSM in the June by-election at La Caverne-Phoenix, where the MSM-Labour candidate took an MMM seat. Jugnauth is clearly looking for a powerful Creole leader—perhaps Berenger—to curb Duval's growing Creole support. Berenger may be forced to adopt an alliance with Jugnauth simply to stay in the game. Berenger's main aim is to finish Duval politically—and Jugnauth has now offered him the chance.

Namibia

Detainees' Parents Group Sues SWAPO's Nujoma

*MB1809150789 Johannesburg SAPA in English
1458 GMT 18 Sep 89*

[Text] Windhoek Sept 18 SAPA—The Parents' Committee of Namibia (PC) instituted Supreme Court proceedings today against the leader of SWAPO [South-West African People's Organization], Mr Sam Nujoma, and senior SWAPO leaders, to secure the release of alleged SWAPO-held detainees.

Documents were served on Mr Nujoma by the deputy sheriff of the Supreme Court in Windhoek.

In a statement today, the PC, a group lobbying for the freeing of SWAPO detainees, said it had brought the court action because its many other efforts to secure the release of detainees had been unsuccessful. The PC claims SWAPO is still holding many prisoners or has caused people to disappear in "blatant violation of the spirit of (United Nations) Resolution 435".

The PC called on SWAPO to release alleged detainees or give a full account of what happened to an alleged 1400 people still missing.

Former SWAPO-held detainees released earlier this year, after being held for allegedly spying for South Africa, said there were many others still in detention or who had disappeared.

SWAPO has said it has released all its political prisoners and invited the international community to investigate for itself claims that the movement still had prisoners in neighbouring countries.

A United Nations mission is due back from Angola and Zambia soon where it has been investigating such claims.

Seychelles

*** USSR Starts Delivery of Building Supplies**

*34000797b Victoria SEYCHELLES NATION
in English 26 Jul 89 pp 1, 2*

[Text] The Soviet Union yesterday delivered some 2,000 tonnes of cement to Seychelles to build yet more community centres throughout the island.

The shipment, which was accompanied by 25 tonnes of tubing, is the first batch of R9 million worth of building materials donated to Seychelles by the Soviet Government.

It was handed over to Community Development Minister Esme Jumeau at the New Port yesterday morning by Soviet ambassador Victor Anisimov.

Under an agreement signed between the two countries in July last year, the Soviet Union is providing cement, reinforcing steel, timber, plywood and other materials to

build community centres in Seychelles. The cement alone amounts to some 6,000 tonnes.

The delivery is free of charge and being made in three consignments up to 1990.

Speaking at the hand-over ceremony as the Soviet freighter "Harry Pollit" unloaded the cement, Minister Jumeau described the donation as a prized gift.

"It is given at a time when the Soviet people need every gramme of the same materials for the reconstruction of their buildings damaged in the earthquake which hit Armenia last year," he pointed out.

Mr Anisimov said the Soviet Government hoped the contribution would go a long way to help finance Seychelles' socioeconomic development projects.

Ministry To Build New Headquarters

Work is to start at the site of the former Rocco restaurant at Mont Fleuri next month on a new headquarters for the Ministry of Planning and External Relations.

The ministry's senior project architect Gilbert Gonthier said the complex, which will comprise a main three-storey building and two pavilions, would take about a year to finish.

The main building, which will have a total floor area of 2,100 square metres, has been designed very much to a kreol style with large verandahs and shuttered doors and windows.

Mr Gonthier said the design had been adopted from one made by the former National Consultancy Services (NCS) in 1985 when it planned to build its new offices at the same site.

The main building will house the Ministry's administration division and most of its planning and economic cooperation and external relations divisions.

The pavilions will accommodate the protocol section, documentation centre and project implementation unit.

Swaziland

Border With South Africa Readjusted

*MB1809190589 Mbabane Domestic Service in English
1600 GMT 18 Sep 89*

[Text] The Government of the Republic of South Africa and the Kingdom of Swaziland have agreed to adjust the borders between them. According to a statement by the South African Department of Cooperation and Development to the Natal ILANGA, a Zulu newspaper, this means that the Kwangwane homeland and the district of Ngwavuma will once again become part of the Kingdom of Swaziland.

All Swazi people outside Swaziland will become citizens of Swaziland. No resettlement of the people living within the present borders of Kangwane and Ngwavuma will be caused by this border adjustment. All existing privileges and benefits will be retained. These include [word indistinct] of social conditions, job opportunities, recognition of private ownership of property, and schooling for children.

Ivory Coast

Cocoa Deal With Phillip Brothers Said Canceled

AB1809211289 Libeville Africa No 1 in French
1830 GMT 18 Sep 89

[Text] Ivory Coast has turned its back on the U.S. negotiators, Phillip Brothers. According to the Paris-based biweekly newspaper, LA LETTRE DU CONTINENT, the agreement for the purchase of 500,000 tons of cocoa from Ivory Coast during the forthcoming harvest season has been canceled. The paper did not say why the Ivorian authorities have made this decision. It only said that the agreement was rejected by President Houphouet-Boigny. But this has not been confirmed by authorities in Abidjan. It will be recalled that the contract in question was signed in August this year. It envisaged that the U.S. negotiators, Phillip Brothers, should [words indistinct] their French counterpart, Sucres et Denrees, 40 percent of the Ivorian 1988-89 harvest, representing a total of 800,000 tons. This is where the first consequences of the Ivorian decision are felt as the agreement between Abidjan and Phillip Brothers has been canceled and the French company, Sucres et Denrees, is now more than some 150,000 tons short of the amount it must supply to its customers in October, November, and December.

With the market which it has just lost, the U.S. company is now trying to gain the maximum benefit. For example, it has been trying to raise by [words indistinct] the cost of cocoa on the international market. The case is perhaps not yet totally closed. The agreement that Ivory Coast has just canceled concerns an immense stock of 500,000 tons of cocoa. This cocoa will return to the Ivorians, who, whether they like it or not, must try to sell it.

Yes, last August, Phillip Brothers wrestled the market away from Sucres et Denrees. It can be said that the French are perhaps not the greatest losers in this affair. That perhaps explains the small importance they attach to the payment difficulties.

Senegal

* Murid Caliph Power as King Maker Decried

34190294a Dakar WAL FADJRI in French 7 Jul 89 p 5

[Article by Abdou Sow]

[Text] The new general caliph of the Murids has scarcely been installed, and already he is being frantically courted by the various components of the Senegalese political class. Each group is hoping to enter his good graces so that when the time comes, the famous "ndigel" will be decreed in its favor or at least will not be turned against it. The weight carried by the "ndigel" in election periods is well known.

During the ceremonies marking the 8th day since the preceding caliph's death, all those nurturing the ambition to someday lead this country either turned up in Touba or sent their representatives, being firmly determined to show their affliction over the mourning and display their deep attachment to the leaders of the Murids. The minister of finance, who was there representing the government, made no bones about it. He forthrightly asked Abdoul Ahad Mbacke's successor to adopt the same conciliatory attitude toward the chief of state and to show him the same benevolence and support that his predecessor had. His tone was one of supplication.

The presence of the opposition was remarkable both by the number and by the quality of its representatives. Those who did not make the trip to Touba more than made up for it by issuing press communiques in which they spoke highly of the deceased before expressing the tremendous hopes aroused in them by the advent of the new caliph, whose great qualities they praised. What it all boils down to basically is the old practice of swearing allegiance that is summed up in the phrase "The king is dead; long live the king."

During the colonial period in Senegal, relations between the spiritual and the temporal were marked by manipulation of the religious brotherhoods by the French administration, which saw in those huge groups an irreplaceable instrument for imposing its views and objectives on the native inhabitants. It was through the Muslim brotherhoods that peanut cultivation was introduced into the peasant world and expanded with relative ease. But that collusion between politics and religion was very often the source of serious and lasting dissension within the brotherhoods and even in society as a whole. In his important book "Wolof Society,"¹ sociologist Abdoulaye Bara Diop, currently director of the Sheikh Anta Diop IFAN [Basic Institute of Black Africa], mentions a few examples showing what was at stake as well as the origins and consequences of the introduction of politics into religion.

Thus, there is a solidly rooted tradition that says that the religious authority should be firmly present during elections and that it should tip the scales in favor of its chosen candidate. And it is perfectly understandable that the late Abdoul Ahad Mbacke's funeral should have eminent political significance. The deceased had become Diouf's most reliable and most powerful ally and had issued strict orders to vote for the latter in 1983 and 1988.

It has also happened at times that divergent political alliances have been formed within the hierarchy of a single brotherhood, a situation that can degenerate into very serious conflicts. There is no lack of examples to show the value of caution when it comes to pushing a religious brotherhood into this or that political camp, because, as the author of the above-mentioned book so rightly emphasizes, "the obvious overstepping of the bounds of religion through the adoption of partisan

political stands that cause or aggravate internal dissensions within their brotherhoods have caused the marabouts to be looked upon with a critical eye by the faithful, who accuse them of going beyond their role as spiritual guides and of compromising themselves with respect to the parties or the political power".

It needs to be noted, however, that whereas during the colonial period, it was the administration that called the shots and made the religious leaders play the role of intermediaries, things are completely different today. What we are seeing is the domination of politics by the religious brotherhoods. Was it not President Diouf himself who publicly proclaimed that he regarded the deceased Murid caliph as his father? His choice of words was not an innocent one. It very obviously reflected the prime position occupied by the religious leaders in the choice of statesmen and even in the priorities of the development programs.

And at present there is no reason to think that the attitude of the politicians is going to change in coming years. On the contrary. The reason, probably, is that none of the many Senegalese political parties has yet been able to develop a coherent approach to convincing the voters that its program for government is a pertinent one. Except for slogans and appeals for support based on the charisma of a single individual (something that does not get a lot of people excited), the only recourse is to rely on the backing of influential spiritual leaders.

This almost general trend (there are certain political groups that refuse, despite everything, to play the game) robs Senegalese political life of its substance and belies the state's secular pretensions. The logical culmination of this process would be a decision to abolish expensive elections and accept as chief of state the candidate appointed by a college of religious leaders who, in actuality, function as grand electors. Such a hypothetical case is obviously an absurdity from the standpoint of political plurality, which cannot be conceived of simply as a projection of the configuration of religious configurations.

Footnote

1. Aboulaye Bara Diop, "Wolof Society, Systems of Inequality and Domination," Karthala Publishing House.

* French Role in Banking Sector Worries Locals

34190295a Dakar SUD HEBDO in French 6 Jul 89 p 5

[Article by Hussein Ba]

[Text] Everyone is talking about the banking reorganization but few people know anything about it. The government is keeping quiet. Conjectures, hypotheses, and "scenarios"—everything is passing through people's minds, but the plan remains obstinately secret. Is the fruit ripe? That is, will the plan soon be fully operational? Yes. Unless there is a "social blockage." The

Central Fund, which is one of the main providers of funds for the plan, has just released 11 billion for financing it. But with the plan on the verge of becoming a reality, what do Senegalese employers—the primary users of the system in question—really think of it?

Overall, they are not satisfied. First of all, because the government is not informing them of the plan's main outlines. That attitude is considered to reflect a lack of perspicacity in view of the organic interpenetration of the banking, industrial, and commercial sectors. "In our opinion, if the reorganization plan focuses solely on the financial reorganization of a few establishments in trouble, it will be missing the mark. What needs to be revised qualitatively is the entire relational system between banking activity and our planned development—I would say even our economic future," says Babacar Diouf, chairman of the CNES (National Council of Senegal Employers).

Despite the absence of broad discussion concerning the purpose of the plan—a necessary corollary to lack of dialogue!—Senegalese economic agents are drawing attention to the many blockages and gaps in the banking system as it currently exists. Its activity is heavily dominated by short-term operations, with commercial activity taking precedence over industrial investment. The reign of the traveling salesman? That orientation makes access to credit problematical for a growing number of entrepreneurs. That is not all. Some entrepreneurs denounce the spirit of the interbank rules favoring agreements among bankers on specific areas in their field, an example being the variation in bank charges. Those rules are described as "illegal agreements" in the sense that they violate the rules of competition.

It was in that atmosphere of resentment that the "affair involving the USB [Senegalese Banking Union] and the Lyons Credit Bank" occurred. The healthy portion of the Senegalese bank has just been transferred to the French bank under the terms of an agreement backed by the government. "It is a real shame. This is where we are after 30 years of independence. Those who left are finding it very easy to come back," exclaimed one young manager. The return of the French is causing worry, all the more since there are officially confirmed reports that credit rules will soon be liberalized. And in the eyes of some economic agents, such a step by the authorities is likely to encourage banks controlled by French capital to favor local French firms.

In the face of such a situation, Senegalese employers are trying to unite. The CNP [National Employers Council] and the GES [Economic Groups of Senegal] are drawing closer together and seeking means of positive cooperation. They are holding more and more meetings. Among other things, the menu for discussion includes the Senegalese-Mauritanian crisis and, above all, the banking situation that prevails in Senegal. What is more, the idea of establishing a new bank is gaining ground in some business sectors. And this just when the idea that the

Senegalese banking system is saturated is being increasingly put forward. That brings up the question of whether such an initiative may not run up against the hostility of public authorities "concerned" to set the sector in order.

*** Bankers Urge Credit Liberalization in Reform**

34190295b Dakar SUD HEBDO in French 6 Jul 89 p 5

[Article by H. Ba]

[Text] The banks' balance sheets reveal the predominance of short-term loans to the commercial sector.

What is hidden behind that attitude? In banking circles, there are plenty of arguments to justify that preference. They say it is a survival reflex. For a long time, the banks were subject to the law on credit orientation that was promulgated by the state with a view to achieving its objectives with respect to economic and social development. Experience has shown that most economic agents are engaged in unprofitable activities.

Added to that is the risk of having tied-up assets out of all proportion to available financial resources, the uncertainties surrounding refinancing by the BCEAO [Central Bank of the West African States], the lack of serious intentions on the part of certain customers, whether backed by the state or not, and so on.

There are many examples of unfair practices by national entrepreneurs. Such things as issuing checks without sufficient funds and diverting financing to purposes unrelated to the original objectives have increased in recent years.

The bankers point out that the reverses experienced by the USB [Senegalese Banking Union], the BCS [expansion unknown], and the BNDS [Senegal National Development Bank] provide eloquent evidence of the responsibility borne by those economic agents in connection with the current difficulties in the banks. That situation, combined with the general economic crisis, is reflected in the portfolios of the banks, which have been seriously

weakened to the point of threatening the monetary and financial system as a whole. The bankers are saying loud and clear that they have no problems of conscience.

They also feel that they have made a lot of loans. But since the system has its rules, the economic stagnation is causing it to fall back on more commercial sectors in the strict sense. "The money we lend does not belong to us. We borrow from customers who trust us, from the BCEAO, or from parent firms, depending on the institution in question," explains Mr Sarre, permanent secretary of the APB (Professional Banking Association).

Starting from that reality, bankers concerned with the sound management of customer deposits cannot, in defiance of elementary orthodoxy, continue to finance operations that experience has shown to be too risky. All the more since the recent establishment of new banking institutions such as the International Bank of Credit and Commerce (BCCI) and Citibank is disrupting normal habits by introducing new banking behavior. The BCCI, with its daily risk management based on the so-called cash flow method (cash flow resulting from payments received), and Citibank with its light structures, its deliberate choice of "excellent risks," and its low rates are attracting several local industrial firms that are large and solvent. Responding to the laws of the marketplace, the others are gradually adjusting their services in keeping with the new banking environment. And the authorities are reacting to that "downward drift." The BCEAO has gradually reduced the spread between its normal interest rate and its preferential rate.

The difference between those rates now amounts to about 1 percent. Liberalization of credit controls and a return to a single basic interest rate are being demanded by the bankers.

More than ever, they want to manage their affairs like businessmen, free of all constraints unrelated to realities in the field.

The government fully supports that idea.

That is one of the major aspects of the reform of the banking system that is now taking shape.

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